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 The identifiability effect is the human propensity to have stronger 
emotions regarding identifiable individuals or groups than for 
abstract ones. The more information that is available about a person, 
the more likely this person’s situation will influence human 
decisionmaking. This human propensity has biased law and public 
policy against environmental and ecological protection because the 
putative economic victims of environmental regulation are usually 
easily identifiable workers that lose their jobs, while the 
beneficiaries—people who avoid a premature death from air or water 
pollution, people who would be saved by medicinal compounds 
available only in rare plant and animal species, and future 
generations not subjected to harmful changes in climate—are 
unidentifiable abstractions.  
 More fundamentally, however, this identifiability bias has helped 
create structural biases in legal institutions against environmental 
and ecological protection. For example, the doctrine of standing 
creates a bias against unidentifiable victims of environmental wrongs, 
because of the obvious necessity of showing injury in fact to an 
identifiable party. Other legal concepts common to a liberal legal 
tradition also serve to protect the interests of individuals—identifiable 
individuals—against state action. This liberal conception of law 
underweights the rights of unidentifiable individuals that are often 
beneficiaries of state action.  
 Importantly, this is not simply a variant of public choice theory. 
Many lawmaking decisions and institutions harbor biases against 
unidentifiable individuals that are not explainable in monetary 
terms. And importantly, this is not simply a variant of the availability 
heuristic. Identifiability is more subtle and lasting than 
sensationalist media accounts of spectacular events that serve as 
available heuristics. The identifiability bias in environmental law is 
based on a fundamental human instinct, not a monetary one, and 
affects deeper decisionmaking processes. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Associate Dean, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. The author 
thanks Robin Kundis Craig, Joseph Feller, Cherie Metcalf, Bruce Pardy, and Hoi Kong for 
their help and comments, and David Madani, Ida Martin, and Jeffrey Yuen for their 
research assistance. This Article was written with the support of the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada.   
434  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:433 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................  434 
 II. THE IDENTIFIABILITY EFFECT...........................................................................  437 
 III. THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW .......................................  440 
 IV. INCIDENTAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES ...............................................................  451 
A. Bias in Legislatures ...................................................................................  451 
B. Bias in the Judiciary..................................................................................  456 
C. Bias in Administrative Agencies ................................................................  458 
 V. STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES..............................................................  461 
A. Bias in Legislatures – Grandfathering ......................................................  461 
B. Bias in the Judiciary – Standing...............................................................  465 
1. Injury in fact ........................................................................................  466 
2. Traceability to Action of Defendant .....................................................  469 
3. Redressability ......................................................................................  470 
4. Standing Requirements: A Filter as a Structural Bias .......................  471 
C. Bias in Administrative Agencies – Regulatory Reform..............................  474 
 VI. WHY DO STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES FORM?....................................  478 
 VII. COUNTERING THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS ..........................................................  482 
A. The Occasional Environmental Bias .........................................................  482 
B. More Systematic Fixes for the Identifiability Bias.....................................  485 
1. Curbing Discretion: The ESA ..............................................................  486 
2. Curbing Discretion: NEPA ..................................................................  488 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis ...........................................................................  491 
4. Claim Aggregation...............................................................................  501 
 VIII. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  503 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Consuming about half of the front page of the June 23, 2005, 
Globe and Mail newspaper of Canada, was an up-close photo of a 
forty-one-year-old woman hugging her twelve-year-old daughter, 
with an accompanying headline of “Breast cancer survivors fighting 
for new drug.”1 The woman is Ontario breast cancer patient Leslie 
Cowan, and the drug is Herceptin, a drug believed to have novel 
breast cancer-fighting properties.2 But because Ontario’s Health 
Minister had not yet approved the use of Herceptin, it was not a drug 
treatment that the province would have paid for under its public 
health care system at the time.3 So, as the article reported, Leslie 
Cowan was seeking treatment in the United States (U.S.), which 
would cost her approximately $100,000 a year.4 Ms. Cowan was 
reported as saying, “I will have to remortgage my home in order to 
receive cancer treatment in the U.S. . . . . I don’t know if my kids will 
be able to go to college, but at least I’ll be alive.”5 
 The very next day, the Globe and Mail reported that the Ontario 
Health Ministry would fast-track the review process so that 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Lisa Priest, Breast Cancer Survivors Fighting for New Drug, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Toronto), June 23, 2005, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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Herceptin would become fundable by the province within a few 
months.6 Health Minister George Smitherman was quoted in the 
article as saying “I’m a human being like anybody else and I’m 
personally impacted by personal stories . . . . I have a very, very keen 
personal sense of the degree to which this is a tremendously 
impactful decision point for some women and many families in the 
province of Ontario.”7  
 It certainly seems callous to take issue with the Health Minister’s 
intervention. But, one wonders, when George Smitherman jumped 
Herceptin to the top of the queue, what drugs were pushed aside? 
Might there have been people who were hurt by this move? 
 One drug that might have been held up was Methotrexate, which 
was approved for provincial funding in October 2005, shortly after 
Herceptin’s approval.8 Methotrexate is a curiously versatile drug that 
is used in chemotherapy treatment for acute lymphoblastic leukemia 
(most commonly children’s leukemia), rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s 
disease, psoriasis, and ironically, breast cancer.9 Much is still 
unknown about Methotrexate, despite a great deal of clinical study.10 
Was a possible delay in the funding of Methotrexate worth it? Quite 
possibly, but a rational inquiry would examine a variety of factors, 
including the incidences of the diseases treated by Methotrexate and 
Herceptin, their effectiveness in treating such diseases, their 
incremental effectiveness relative to existing treatments, and 
perhaps their cost. The week that Herceptin was approved, the 
Canadian Medical Association Journal published an editorial 
questioning the wisdom of the province’s approval, especially given 
the $148 million price tag funding Herceptin and two other drugs 
over a three-year period.11  
 But the way that a newspaper story changed, in one day, the 
priorities of the largest provincial health ministry in Canada is much 
more important and subtle. The response to the June 23, 2005 
article, which focused so intensely on Leslie Cowan and her family, 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Lisa Priest, Ontario Will Fast-Track Breast Cancer Drug, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Toronto), June 24, 2005, at A1. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario Drug Benefit 
Formulary/Comparative Drug Index, Methotrexate (search record on file with author). 
 9. MedlinePlus, U.S. National Library of Medicine and the National Institute of 
Health, Methotrexate, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/medmaster/ 
a682019.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); MedicineNet.com, Methotrexate, 
http://www.medicinenet.com/methotrexate/article.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); National 
Psoriasis Foundation, Systemic Treatments: Methotrexate, http://www.psoriasis.org/ 
treatment/psoriasis/systemics/methotrexate.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 10. A Pubmed search turned up over 5700 medical journal articles discussing 
Methotrexate. Pubmed, http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 11. Editorial, Genomics and Economics, 173 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 329 (2005); see also 
Elaine Carey, Do Politics Affect Drug Coverage?, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 19, 2005, at D02. 
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illustrates how the identifiability of individuals profoundly affects 
public policy and lawmaking. This story was decisively effective in 
identifying Leslie Cowan and other breast cancer victims and 
pushing their appeal to the top of the agenda. What gets ignored, 
however, is the effect that this diversion of Health Ministry resources 
might have had on people that might have benefited from 
Methotrexate or other drugs that were delayed in approval or study 
because of the fast-tracking of Herceptin. These individuals were 
unconsciously shoved aside because they were less clearly 
identifiable to the Ontario Health Minister.  
 This anecdote is, of course, only one example of a legal or policy 
decision that is affected by the identifiability of stakeholders to some 
dispute. This Article argues that environmental law is an area of law 
and policy that is particularly susceptible to systemic bias due to 
stakeholder identifiability. The problem is that the beneficiaries of 
environmental law tend to be less identifiable than those that might 
be economically harmed by environmental law. As a result, the 
identifiability effect works a consistent bias against the cause of 
environmental protection, and in some cases, economic progress as 
well. Part II of this Article describes the identifiability effect, as 
developed by psychologists. Part III discusses how the identifiability 
effect impacts public debate over environmental issues. Part IV sets 
out several examples of environmental conflicts that have been 
affected by the identifiability of stakeholders. While Part IV 
describes specific instances of the identifiability bias affecting the 
outcome of environmental conflicts, Part V describes cases in which 
the identifiability bias has insinuated itself into the very structure of 
law in ways that work to the systematic detriment of environmental 
protection. Part VI examines why structural identifiability biases 
exist. Part VII of this Article discusses how the identifiability bias 
may be countered. Some cases are discussed in which environmental 
advocates have been able to use the identifiability effect to their 
advantage, finding a stakeholder group with interests that are 
coincident with an environmental goal, thus making them somehow 
more identifiable than the economic victims of environmental 
protection. While environmental advocates are occasionally able to 
tap into the identifiability bias, this Article argues that these cases 
are the exception, not the norm. This Part examines several 
legislative and administrative mechanisms that have reduced the 
identifiability bias in environmental law and policy. These 
mechanisms curb the judicial and administrative discretion that 
allows identifiability to creep into environmental decisionmaking and 
are the key to more systemic reform that will keep the identifiability 
bias under wraps. Part VIII concludes with some summary remarks. 
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II.   THE IDENTIFIABILITY EFFECT 
 Identifiability is the propensity for people to have stronger 
emotions regarding identifiable individuals or groups than for 
abstract, unidentifiable ones.12 Psychological researchers have long 
known that the more information there is available about a person, 
the more memorable that person becomes, and the more likely that 
this person’s situation will influence human decisionmaking.13 Thus, 
we are more inclined to help or favor people who can be readily seen 
or heard than we are for more abstract, statistical victims. 
Charitable organizations have known for a long time that people are 
more willing to lend aid to a cause that has a vivid poster child. The 
identifiability effect also seems to exist for punitive impulses—people 
seem more willing to punish wrongdoers that they can identify, as 
opposed to those they cannot.14 The identifiability effect was, at least 
in earlier versions, a theory of a linkage between “vividness” and 
intensity of conviction.15 As Nobel Laureate economist Thomas 
Schelling said in 1968, “when we know the people, we care.”16 
 Research findings on identifiability clearly pose challenges to 
economic assumptions of rationality. The identifiability effect also 
raises the problem that human decisionmaking and public 
policymaking could be inconsistent across situations with different 
identifiability characteristics, even if the situations are substantively 
indistinguishable. As psychological researchers have pointed out,17 
while “Baby Jessica” McClure was trapped in a well for several days, 
sympathetic media-watchers sent her family over $700,000 to assist 
with rescue efforts—enough money to save hundreds of children’s 
lives if spent on preventative health care;18 also, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement was met with fierce resistance (and continues 
to be the subject of criticism) because opponents could point to 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Although they do not set out a formal definition, Deborah A. Small & George 
Loewenstein describe and study the phenomenon in more specificity in their article The 
Devil You Know: The Effects of Identifiability on Punishment. 18 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 
311 (2005).   
 13. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980). 
 14. Experimental situations have shown that research subjects have been more 
willing to punish misdeeds carried out by more identifiable wrongdoers, even if given very 
modest identifiability markers, such as numbers. See Small & Loewenstein, supra note 12; 
George Loewenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable and Iconic Victims and Perpetrators 
(Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 
301, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678281. 
 15. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 237 (1997). 
 16. T. C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 129-30 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr., ed., 1968).  
 17. The following examples are noted in Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 235-
36. 
 18. Id. at 236. 
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individuals in specific industries that were likely to lose their jobs, 
while proponents could only argue that the additional economic 
prosperity would create some unidentifiable jobs, somewhere.19 In the 
criminal law context, the difference between a murder trial in which 
nothing is said or shown about the murder victim and one in which 
the identity of the victim is prominently on display, may mean the 
difference between acquittal and conviction,20 or, in the sentencing 
phase, the difference between life and death.21 Perhaps most 
troubling, the conscious use of identifiability as a rhetorical weapon 
in some instances and not others, and for some causes and not 
others, will create an added impetus for some causes and not others, 
an impetus that may not be warranted. 
 It is now an oversimplification to say that identifiability is merely 
a theory of “vividness.”22 The psychological explanations of 
identifiability have evolved over the last decade. What exactly is the 
cognitive process that makes people more willing to help or punish? 
Is it truly just an emotional link between the vividness of a person 
and our inclination to help or punish? In addition to the vividness 
theory, recent experiments on the impulse to help have suggested 
three other possible theories for the identifiability effect:  
 CERTAINTY: Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect theory” posits 
that people overweight certain outcomes relative to uncertain ones.23 
As compared to statistical victims, identifiable victims exist with 100 
percent certainty, so that efforts to help such a person will definitely 
benefit a person. Identifiability in this sense, by eliminating the 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Walter Goodman, TV, by Its Very Nature, Can Stack the Deck, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 1993, at C20. 
 20. A recent case before the Supreme Court involved the question of whether it was 
inherently and critically prejudicial for a murder victim’s family to sit in the second row of 
the gallery wearing buttons that displayed the victim’s picture. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. 
Ct. 649 (2006).  
 21. For some empirical evidence on the proposition that victim impact statements 
affect the likelihood of a death sentence, see Edith Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in 
Capital Cases: Does the Victim’s Character Matter?, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 
(1998); James Lugmbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: 
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5-6 (1995). The Supreme Court has 
itself flipped on the legal question, holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), 
that victim impact statements at the sentencing phase were inadmissible, but then 
overruling that just four years later in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991). For 
a lively scholarly exchange about the effects and the appropriateness of victim impact 
statements, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim 
Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545; and Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? 
A Reply to Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479. 
 22. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 237. 
 23. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  
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uncertainty as to whether someone truly benefits, is the greater 
certainty that a tangible positive outcome will occur.24  
 REFERENCE GROUP: People overweight risks that are faced by a 
specific group or region because they conceive of risks more 
concretely in smaller groups.25 If risks are dispersed throughout a 
larger population, people tend to underweight this risk relative to a 
risk that is faced by a larger fraction of a smaller group, even if the 
number of people at risk is the same.26 So a 10% risk faced by 
100,000 people will be viewed with more seriousness than a 1% risk 
faced by one million people. Under this theory of identifiability, 
people prefer to help identifiable victims because the identification, 
in effect, creates a “reference group” composed entirely of the 
identified victims.27 This effect can be empirically separated from the 
certainty effect.28 
 EX ANTE VS. EX POST: Once an event has occurred, people attach 
greater blame and responsibility to the event for a victim’s plight, 
providing greater impetus to the need to help.29 People may thus feel 
more compelled to help someone once misfortune has befallen him or 
her, rather than take preventative measures to help avoid the 
misfortune.30 Since identifiable victims typically only become 
identifiable because the misfortune has occurred, people may be 
expressing a desire to help people ex post, rather than ex ante. 
 The most recent experimental simulations seem to favor the 
“reference group” theory of identifiability.31 This is an important 
finding because it shows that the identifiability effect is not simply 
another version of the availability heuristic,32 in which vividness 
merely makes examples seem more familiar and available to people. 
The identifiability effect can be much more subtle, tapping into 
cognitive processes that affect how people view the place of 
individuals and groups within a larger society. That said, there is 
considerable overlap among all four of these theories, and no 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See generally Milton C. Weinstein et al., The Economic Value of Changing 
Mortality Probabilities: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 94 Q. J. ECON. 373, 374, 393-95 
(1980) (analyzing the theory of willingness to pay in order to affect probability of death). 
 25. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 238-39. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: 
Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7 (2003) (citing research 
findings in Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15). 
 29. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 239. 
 30. Weinstein et al., supra note 24, at 374. 
 31. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 249-53.  
 32. The availability heuristic is the propensity for people to overweight probabilistic 
outcomes in which they have a readily available experience to relate to. Highly media-
publicized events tend to serve as availability heuristics. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1509-10 (1998). 
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disentanglement has been made so that one theory of identifiability 
has emerged. For purposes of this Article, it seems safe to conclude 
that whatever the cognitive process for people feeling more strongly 
about identifiable persons than unidentifiable ones, the more 
information we have about a person or group, and the more specific 
we can be about a person or group, the more likely we are to help or 
punish.33 It is nevertheless useful to keep separate these four specific 
theories of identifiability, as they help us recognize and analyze more 
specific patterns of behavior. 
 From a rhetorical perspective, these experimental simulations 
confirm that which skilled legal advocates already know: that 
invoking vivid images and being more specific about people, rather 
than appealing to abstract notions, helps win arguments. Law 
professors are well aware of the pedagogical value of using actual 
stories about real people to help illustrate a point. Lawmakers as 
well, most of whom are trained in these skills of persuasion, have 
frequently drawn on identifiability as a rhetorical tool. In fact, the 
danger is that lawmaking has become unduly influenced by the 
identifiability of stakeholders.  
III.   THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 The identifiability effect poses special problems for environmental 
law and policy, such that it consistently biases lawmaking against 
environmental and ecological protection. While environmental debate 
is hardly alone among hot-button topics in eliciting emotionally 
charged public debate, environmental law is particularly vulnerable 
to behavioral anomalies that are tapped by identifiability oriented 
arguments. Emotional arguments that emphasize the economic 
hardship of identified individuals or groups tap into heuristic 
processes that cause an overweighting of the costs of environmental 
protection and underweighting of the benefits of environmental 
protection. This creates a bias against the enhancement of 
environmental quality or ecological protection. Emotional appeals, 
from both environmental advocates and skeptics of environmental 
regulation, bring these biases to the fore, essentially substituting an 
emotional intensity meter for a rational means of making 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Even small amounts of information, such as a number that identified but did not 
name a victim, made research subjects significantly more likely to aid victims. Small & 
Loewenstein, supra note 28, at 8-11. In one study, a group of research subjects were given 
$10 to begin with. Id. at 8. At random, the $10 was taken away from half of the subjects. 
Id. The half retaining their $10 were asked if they were willing to give up some of their $10 
to aid those that had lost theirs. Id. at 8-9. Their willingness to do so was highly correlated 
with the amount of information they had about the person or persons losing their $10. Id. 
at 9-10. Even a small amount of information, such as a number that represented a specific 
person, boosted willingness to pay, as compared with a situation in which no information 
at all was available about a victim. Id. 
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environmental decisions. In part because of the identifiability effect, 
those arguing for greater environmental quality or ecological 
protection on the basis of emotional appeals will generally lose this 
contest.  
 Consider a typical debate over a proposed environmental or 
ecological law that tightens some standard, at some economic cost, or 
over an existing law that regulated parties believe is unduly 
restrictive. Detractors of the law will be able to point to specific 
individuals or specific communities that will supposedly lose their 
jobs or their way of life if the proposed law is enacted or complain 
that the existing law is overly protective of the environment.34 Of 
course, these claims are often exaggerated by affected industries. But 
more to the point, these putative economic victims of environmental 
protection are highly identifiable to most people. Moreover, these 
victims are often romanticized—loggers, ranchers, farmers, and 
fishers as rugged frontiersmen, and mineworkers and factory 
workers as noble laborers—and are thus strong attractors of 
sympathy from lawmakers and the general public. The same Globe 
and Mail that gave Leslie Cowan her fame also featured on the front 
page of its August 19, 2005 British Columbia section a huge photo of 
ruddy-faced sixty-seven-year-old fisher Mike Forrest, who was going 
to suffer because of the planned closure of the Pacific salmon 
fishery.35 The article tells us that Mr. Forrest “invested $350,000 in 
an aluminum boat in the 1990s for commercial salmon fishing. He 
said he believed federal politicians who promised that a 
reorganization of the Pacific salmon fisheries would ensure the 
livelihood of those who kept their federal fishing licences . . . . But 
that’s not how things worked out.”36 This story was long on the life of 
Mike Forrest, a third generation salmon fisher (“My dad did this, my 
grandfather did it. This is who I am, what I’m about.”), yet was 
remarkably bereft of any mention of the collapse of the Pacific 
salmon that necessitated the closure,37 and, incredibly, of the long-
suffering aboriginal fishers and their legally superior rights to fish 
for Pacific salmon.38 Nevertheless, the Canadian Department of 
                                                                                                                     
 34. President George H.W. Bush campaigned for re-election in 1992 on a platform of 
reforming the ESA, vowing to block renewal of the ESA and arguing for a reformed law 
that would give “greater consideration to jobs, families and communities.” Michael Wines, 
Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at A25. 
 35. Robert Matas, Fish Season to Get the Hook, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 19, 
2005, at S1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Population Numbers May Doom Salmon: Scientists, Analysts Believe Wild 
Pacific Fish Could Become Extinct, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 7, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9239431/. 
 38. See Emily Walter et al., Fishing Around the Law: The Pacific Salmon 
Management System as a “Structural Infringement” of Aboriginal Rights, 45 MCGILL L.J. 
263 (2000). 
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Fisheries and Oceans opened up a consultation process in the Fall of 
2005 that resulted in a number of meetings with the Commercial 
Salmon Advisory Board (the fishers’ organization) lasting into 2006,39 
before finally limiting the Fraser River salmon fishery to a nominal 
four-fish-per-day catch for the 2006 season.40 An entire year was lost 
in attending to the economic needs of the Fraser River salmon 
fishers. 
 Of course, the Globe and Mail is hardly alone in serial 
sensationalism—examples abound in which a tension is deliberately 
created between environmental protection and the economic health 
of some identifiable group of individuals, with the obvious media 
preference for reporting on the latter.41 More significantly, 
congressional lawmakers have become extremely skilled at using the 
identifiability effect to dramatize the plight of their constituents,42 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., Canada Dep’t of Fisheries & Oceans, Fisheries Mgmt., Pac. Region, Wild 
Salmon Policy, http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/species/salmon/wsp/default_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 40. The fishery area in question, the Fraser River, suffered large declines in sockeye 
salmon runs in 2004 and 2005, leading to the proposed and slowly implemented fishing 
restrictions. The limits are available at http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/recfish/Tidal/area 
29_e.htm#Salmon (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).  
 41. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Hook, Line and Sunk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6 
(Magazine), at 75 (“[Clenching a knife in his teeth, fingers bloodied] from a long night 
wrestling squid and a new net that cuts to the bone, Tony Demelo finishes up his chores in 
the port where Herman Melville learned how to swear. The morning light has chased away 
the prostitutes and drug dealers who roam the cobbled streets of New Bedford’s waterfront 
district, bartering in Portuguese. Nearby, commuter traffic carries workers with soft hands 
and clean clothes to office towers in Providence and Boston.”); Lisa Leff, Company Town 
Carved From Old Growth Faces Uncertain Future¸ WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/31/AR2006123100407 
_pf.html (describing uncertainty facing company logging town being sold because of 
decreased logging opportunities due to environmental restrictions); Tom Pelton, Suit 
Threat Frustrates Hog Farmers: Environmental Groups Targeting Bay Pollution, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 22, 2007, at 1A (highlighting the plight of pig farmers whose manure 
is causing water pollution in the Chesapeake Bay); Joe Wojtas, An Old Fleet Under a Dark 
Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at 14CN (describing in detail the economic dislocation of 
the Portuguese immigrant fishers of Stonington, Conn.). 
 42. In just looking at the issue of grazing on public lands, for example, Michael Byrne, 
president of the Public Lands Council, complained that Wild and Scenic River designations 
have caused dislocation in the cattle ranching industry that depends on federal grazing 
permits: 
More than 50 operations ran cattle along the subject area of the Donner 
and Blixen, Owyhee, and Malheur Rivers, involving hundreds of people 
if you consider that each operation often consisted of several different 
families. Elimination of these ranch operations means the elimination of 
a way of life that has been in place for generations in many cases. 
Grazing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Forests of the S. Comm. on 
Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. 24 (2005) (prepared statement of Michael 
Byrne, President, Public Lands Council, on Behalf of the National Cattlemen’s Beef 
Association). Congressman Scott McInnis has also weighed in by stating: 
[U]nfortunately, what happens out there is . . . the national Sierra Club, 
Earth First, and by the way, most of these are headquartered not in this 
area, they are headquartered back here in the East, primarily in 
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momentarily crowding out everyone else that may have a stake in 
the outcome of an environmental conflict. Even if the identified 
groups are quite large, advocates on their behalf have succeeded in 
reducing the reference group size so that the group is at least more 
identifiable than the reference group of beneficiaries—all of the rest 
of us. 
 In stark contrast to the identifiability of those who are 
economically harmed by environmental regulation, the beneficiaries 
of environmental protection are mostly unidentifiable. Air pollution 
and water pollution and environmental exposure to toxic substances 
claim many victims, resulting in the premature death of many and 
sickening many others.43 Consider this: air pollution from coal-fired 
power plants alone are estimated to cause 30,000 premature deaths 
in the U.S. every year,44 the equivalent of approximately one fully 
                                                                                                                     
Washington D.C., who come into this area and try and dictate . . . the 
policies of their special interests on the management of these Federal 
lands . . . . The kind of impact that it has is, it drives our ranching 
communities [out] . . . . And these families, and again look at my in-laws, 
David and Sue Ann Smith, we can still see the cabins where their 
grandparents came and homesteaded in that area. And they are very 
dependent frankly upon multiple use of Federal land. So is everybody in 
Meeker, Colorado. So is everybody in Grand Junction. 
144 CONG. REC. H2804-05 (May 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. McInnis). From the Senate 
side: 
I don’t think people understand that ranching is the economic backbone 
for many rural communities in the West . . . . [W]hen you kill the 
ranching industry you also kill Main Street. I believe a disproportionate 
increase in a fee could do just that, and . . . would indeed have 
devastating repercussions for the rancher and the community. 
142 CONG. REC. S2397-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (arguing against an increase 
in grazing fees for grazing on federal lands). 
 43. For a general discussion on the health effects of air and water pollution, see Robin 
Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation, Public 
Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2007). 
 44. A consulting firm, Abt Associates, which has contracted with the EPA and a 
number of environmental organizations, estimated in 2000 that coal-fired power plants 
accounted for roughly 30,000 premature deaths each year. ABT ASSOCS., THE PARTICULATE-
RELATED HEALTH BENEFITS OF REDUCING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS, EXHIBIT 6-3, 
ESTIMATED PM-RELATED HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR QUALITY 
CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE REMSAD-BASED “ALL POWER PLANT” SCENARIO 6-4 
(2000). This figure has been cited on numerous occasions, and over time, seems to have 
withstood the barrage of electricity industry attacks on Abt Associates and the study. See, 
e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S1515 (Feb. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jeffords), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2004_record&page= 
S1515&position=all; News Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden Backs Clean Air Legislation 
(June 26, 2002) (on file with author); AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE AIR: 
2004, PROTECTING THE NATION FROM AIR POLLUTION, 
http://lungaction.org/reports/sota04_protecting2.html; FY 2006 Budget of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Before the S. Appropriations Subcomm. on Interior & 
Related Agencies, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of S. William Becker, Executive Director, 
State & Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators), available at 
http://www.4cleanair.org/SenateTestimony0405.pdf; Current Environmental Issues 
Affecting the Readiness of the Department of Defense: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
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loaded 747 jumbo jet crashing into a mountainside every week.45 How 
many weeks of a jumbo jet crashing would we tolerate before we 
would completely ground air traffic, or at least undertake heroic 
measures to make air travel safer? Imagine, then, that we knew 
ahead of time which 30,000 people would die in the upcoming year 
from air pollution—is it not conceivable that we would undertake 
similarly heroic measures to reduce air pollution?  
 The epidemiology of air pollution has developed into a science that 
establishes very strong links between air quality (especially the 
concentration of fine particulate matter) and health outcomes and 
has withstood the barrage of industry assault.46 But however 
conclusive the statistical link between air pollution and health 
outcomes, none of the millions of those sickened nor tens of 
thousands dying from air pollution can actually trace their injuries 
or deaths to a specific source of pollution, or even to pollution 
generally. As a result, the prospective victims of air pollution may 
never be identified to anybody and will remain abstract, weak 
attractors of sympathy, and systematically under-represented.  
 To add another dimension to this problem, the identifiability of 
persons decreases dramatically as one looks to the future. It has 
never been a secret that future generations are frequently and 
systematically shortchanged in a wide variety of public policies. We 
demand income tax cuts that drive budgets into deficit and mortgage 
                                                                                                                     
Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of S. William Becker, Executive 
Director, State & Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/04212004hearing1252/Becker1
942.htm; Bernard L. Cohen, The Nuclear Power Advantage, http://www.npcil.nic.in/ 
nupower_vol13_4/npaavol4.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).  
 45. There are many models of Boeing’s 747, but a common one, the 747-400, carries 
524 passengers in a two-class configuration. Technical Characteristics – Boeing 747-400, 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/pf/pf_400_prod.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2008). A quick calculation shows that 524 passengers dying once a week yields 27,248 
deaths per year. 
 46. Event studies have tracked fluctuations in pollution, in particular particulate 
matter, with health outcomes. Changes in health outcomes have been studied in the 
presence of events that change pollution levels. Luke Clancy et al., Effect of Air-Pollution 
Control on Death Rates in Dublin, Ireland: An Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1210 (2002) 
(involving a ban on coal sales); Anthony Johnson Hedley et al., Cardiorespiratory and All-
Cause Mortality after Restrictions on Sulphur Content of Fuel in Hong Kong: An 
Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1646 (2002) (involving new restrictions on the sulfur 
content of fuel oil); C. Arden Pope III et al., Daily Mortality and PM10 Pollution in Utah 
Valley, 47 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 211 (1992) (involving a strike at a local steel mill). 
Other, more statistically robust studies tracked the health outcomes of large groups of 
individuals over long time periods. These “cohort,” or panel data studies, have been the 
focus of several rulemakings and have been heavily scrutinized. Douglas W. Dockery et al., 
An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1753 (1993); C. Arden Pope, III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of 
Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. & CRIT. CARE MED. 669 
(1995); see also Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and 
Mortality, 173 AM. J. RESPIR. & CRIT. CARE MED. 667 (2006). 
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our children’s future so that we have higher current disposable 
income.47 Despite an overwhelming consensus on the need to reduce 
gasoline consumption and reduce pollution from cars and trucks, we 
resist gasoline taxes because they would reduce our current 
disposable income.48 This resistance has easily trumped a nearly 
universal belief among economists that a higher gasoline tax is the 
most effective and efficient way to reduce gasoline consumption.49  
                                                                                                                     
 47. Former Congressional Budget Office Director Robert Reischauer, who served 
under both Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton, was quoted in a New 
York Times article as lamenting the continued failure of Congress to deal with a looming 
budget crisis over the costs of Medicare and Social Security: “The long-term budget crisis 
appears so distant that it’s going to be very hard to get politicians excited about it this year 
. . . . The economy is strong, and the deficit seems to be at manageable levels right now. No 
one wants to risk popular support by doing something courageous.” Steven R. Weisman, 
Democrats Face Limits in Reshaping Bush Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A19. The 
article describes how Congressional Democrats badly wish to overturn President Bush’s 
budget and be seen as balancing the federal budget, but have limited options given that 
they are afraid of the political ramifications of ending the President’s tax cuts, which 
expire in 2010. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Richard Simon & Mary Curtius, GOP Fears Gas Price Anger May Spill 
Over, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at 1. A New York Times/CBS poll conducted in 2006 asked 
if respondents generally favored an increase in gas taxes; 85% said they would oppose it, 
while 12% said they would favor an increase. Respondents were more receptive to a 
gasoline tax if it would reduce global warming, but if the tax was as much as $2.00, 87% 
said they would again oppose it. The poll results are available online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20060228_poll_results.pdf (last visited Feb. 
15, 2008). Writer T.C. Boyle wrote an op-ed in The New York Times purportedly 
“confessing” to being a gas hog. T.C. Boyle, Op-Ed, To Pump or Not to Pump, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2006, at 4. He wrote of his commute between his Santa Barbara home and the 
University of Southern California where he teaches: 
That’s the conundrum out here in the land of the automobile. We’d like 
to do our bit for the environment—and out-of-control gas prices awaken 
in us a fervent desire to save at the pump . . . [but] when Monday comes, 
we need our cars 
 . . . .  
. . . My commute to the University of Southern California is an unholy 
200 miles round-trip and it consumes time . . . and fuel. I drive a 
powerful sports car because of the burning need to subdue and outrace 
all those other commuters, and . . . I make it alone and I make it as 
expeditiously as I can, with little thought for what it is costing, on every 
level. 
Id. 
 49. Economists so universally favor “Pigouvian” taxes to reduce pollution 
externalities, a list of citations would be pointlessly voluminous. A recent Wall Street 
Journal survey of sixty economists found that of the forty-seven respondents, forty favored 
a fossil fuel tax as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Economists Favor Fossil 
Fuels Tax to Spur Alternatives – Survey, E&E NEWS PM, Feb. 8, 2007. An especially 
important Pigouvian tax is a gasoline tax. Economists such as politically diverse New York 
Times columnist Paul Krugman, who has spent virtually every column in the past four 
years criticizing the Bush Administration, and Gregory Mankiw, who served as President 
Bush’s Chief Economic Advisor, favor a higher gasoline tax. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews. 
Economics Adviser Learns the Principles of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, February 26, 2004, at C4; 
Paul Krugman, Gasoline Tax Follies, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 2000, at A23. Professor 
Mankiw is the founder of the “Pigou Club,” an “elite group of pundits and policy wonks 
with the good sense to advocate higher Pigouvian taxes,” which includes higher gasoline 
taxes. Greg Mankiw’s Blog: The Pigou Club Manifesto, 
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 There is no sharper illustration of the human propensity to 
dramatically discount the welfare of future generations than the 
world’s abject failure to deal with the problem of climate change. 
Although awareness of climate change and momentum for climate 
change legislation grows even in the U.S.50—the lone holdout from 
the Kyoto Protocol now that Australia has ratified the agreement51—
it is easy to forget that we have been aware of the risks of climate 
change for decades.52 In 1978, Congress passed the National Climate 
Program Act,53 which required the President to establish a program 
to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to 
natural and man-induced climate processes and their implications.”54 
In 1987, Congress passed the Global Climate Protection Act,55 which 
required, among other things, the establishment of a National 
Climate Program Office, which would develop and carry out national 
policy on climate change.56 Of course, neither law imposed any 
                                                                                                                     
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/10/pigou-club-manifesto.html (Oct. 20, 2006). Nobel 
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, President Clinton’s Chief Economic Advisor, recently called for a 
global carbon tax, justifying such a tax by saying, “[t]here is a social cost to emissions, and 
the common environmental tax would simply make everyone pay the social cost. This is in 
accord with the most basic of economic principles.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for 
Global Warming, 3 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context=ev. A gasoline tax has 
been favored even by the libertarian Grover Norquist, who favors the shifting of tax 
burden from income taxes to consumption taxes such as gasoline taxes. Robert H. Frank, A 
Way to Cut Fuel Consumption That Everyone Likes, Except the Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2006, at C3. 
 50. Felicity Barringer & Andrew C. Revkin, Measures on Global Warming Move to 
Spotlight in the New Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A24 (describing how the 
110th Congress appears to be more apt to move forward with climate change legislation); 
Darren Samuelsohn, Global Warming ‘a Sleeper Issue’ in Midterm Election ― Zogby Poll, 
GREENWIRE, Nov. 17, 2006 (on file with author) (showing that concern with global climate 
change played a role in the Democratic Party gains in the 2006 midterm elections). Even 
President George W. Bush acknowledged the need to address climate change in his state of 
the union address on January 23, 2007, his first reference to global climate change in his 
six years in office. Darren Samuelson, Six Years in, Bush Gives Warming his State of the 
Union Debut, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 24, 2007 (on file with author). 
 51.  In one of his first acts as the new Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd 
obtained ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on December 3, 2007. Australian Government, 
Department of Climate Change, International Activities, Kyoto Protocol, 
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/international/kyoto/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 52. A 1979 National Academy of Sciences report stated that “[w]e now have 
incontrovertible evidence that the atmosphere is indeed changing and that we ourselves 
contribute to that change. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are steadily 
increasing, and these changes are linked with man’s use of fossil fuels and exploitation of 
the land.” CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, REPORT OF AN AD 
HOC STUDY GROUP ON CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE, CLIMATE RESEARCH BOARD, 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL vii (1979), available at http://www.atmos.ucla.edu/~brian 
pm/download/charney_report.pdf.  
 53. Ch. 56, § 2, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000)). 
 54. Id. at § 3 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2000)).  
 55. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1101-06, 101 Stat. 
1407 (1987) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000)). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 2904(c) (2000). 
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binding obligations on anyone to do anything about climate change. 
Senator Timothy Wirth’s 1988 National Energy Policy Act, however, 
called for, among other things, a reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions by 20 percent below 1988 levels by the year 2000, energy 
efficiency regulations on all buildings, and the development of coal 
liquification and carbon dioxide recovery from coal-fired power 
plants.57 Testifying in favor of the law was Dr. Stephen H. Schneider, 
the Stanford climatologist and author of the 1984 book, The 
Coevolution of Climate and Life, and one of the early scientists 
warning of climate change. His explanation of global climate change 
was met by then-Senator Bill Bradley’s remark “[t]hat answer would 
not be understood by any of my constituents [laughter] who would be 
faced with higher electricity rates in order to deal with the situation 
or higher gasoline prices . . . .”58 With the identifiability of his 
constituents affecting one of the Senate’s most reliable 
environmentalists, it is no wonder that Senator Wirth’s bill died. 
 As noted above, there is no controversy among economists that in 
order to reduce pollution from motor vehicles and to reduce 
dependence on foreign suppliers of oil, the preferred method would be 
to increase gasoline taxes. And yet, historically, gasoline taxes have 
been categorically rejected as a means of achieving behavioral 
changes in American driving habits on the grounds that it would 
require difficult behavioral changes in American driving habits. In 
response to a proposed 1975 bill to increase gasoline taxes, 
Congressman Bill Alexander of Arkansas thundered: 
If this tax is enacted, we will be requiring the people of the 
heartland of America to carry this burden on both shoulders. 
It is unfair; it is inequitable; it is grossly discriminatory 
against the . . . people of this country who do not have access 
to public transportation. . . . Did you ever hear of anybody 
catching a subway in Osceola, Arkansas, or a bus in 
Bugtussle, Oklahoma?59 
 The identifiability strategy is patent, drawing Osceola, Bugtussle, 
and “heartland” America into the debate. To underscore the 
divergence of the identifiability effect from public choice theory, 
however, it is important to note that the opposition to the 1975 
                                                                                                                     
 57. S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1988). For a summary of the Act, see The Library of 
Congress, THOMAS, S. 2667, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:SN02667 
:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 58. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE 
CENTURY? 26-27 (Sierra Club Books 1989). 
 59. PIETRO S. NIVOLA & ROBERT W. CRANDALL, THE EXTRA MILE: RETHINKING 
ENERGY POLICY FOR AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION 88-89 (1995) (citing 121 CONG. REC. 
18,435 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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gasoline tax proposal was widespread, attracting representatives 
from many urban centers as well.60  
 Today’s environmental champions are repeating this mistake. 
Jack Layton, the leader of Canada’s federal New Democratic Party 
(NDP), considered the most environmental of the four federal parties, 
is on record as being a strong supporter of the Kyoto Protocol.61 
Layton has been sharply critical of the other political parties’ 
attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Canada as being 
insufficient and weak.62 Incredibly, however, when gasoline prices 
spiked in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Layton called 
for gasoline price regulation. Layton argued that high gasoline prices 
are “affecting people in their daily lives . . . [and] affecting small 
businesses,” and it “isn’t fair to Canadians who have to budget 
around gas prices or cannot rely on adequate public transit 
systems.”63 Perhaps this is just politics. But it is a remarkable 
disconnect between Layton’s public position on climate change and 
the one happenstance that induced Canadians to drive less and 
purchase fuel-efficient vehicles for the first time in decades. Layton’s 
tortured position is made possible by the identifiability of those 
Canadians suffering from high gas prices. And again, under a 
reference group theory of identifiability, these people need not be 
named individuals with their photo splashed across the front page of 
a major newspaper—all that is required is to reduce the reference 
group size to one that people can better identify. 
 To be sure, the rhetoric of much opposition to environmental and 
ecological protection is expressed in terms of economic costs. Many 
debates about environmental and ecological protection are 
characterized by discussion about the economic costs of such 
measures, rather than references to specific individuals and groups 
of people. However, the rhetoric of economic costs is only powerful 
because of its traceability to actual people. Even as President Bush 
and other opponents of greenhouse gas regulation express concern 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Jack Layton, Leader, New Democractic Party, Speech on Climate 
Change Accountability Act (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ndp.ca/page/4892.  
 62. Layton has criticized the current Administration of Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper for its refusal to act on climate change, boasting that it “forced Harper’s flawed 
‘Clean Air Act’ into an all-party committee for a full re-write. The NDP has tabled 15 tough 
amendments, challenging Parliament to adopt a plan for immediate action to combat 
global warming and meet Canada’s Kyoto targets.” NDP, Taking the Lead on Climate 
Change, http://www.ndp.ca/page/4769 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). Also, when current 
Liberal Party leader Stephane Dion Layton was Environment Minister, Layton wrote an 
open letter to Dion criticizing the then-governing Liberal government for its weak plan to 
reduce greenhouse gas emission. Jack Layton, Jack’s Open Letter to Stephane Dion, 
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.ndp.ca/page/1307.  
 63. Mike Adler, Layton Seeks Gas Price Probe, INSIDETORONTO.COM, Aug. 26, 2005 
(on file with author). 
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about the costs of complying with limits on greenhouse gases,64 they 
made it clear that the costs were those that would be suffered by “our 
families and workers,”65 and “American business[es].”66 The inclusion 
of the words “our” and “American” is not accidental.67 It reflects 
conscious attempts to convey the message that costs don’t just accrue 
anywhere—they accrue in identifiable individuals. On the day that 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its 
fourth and most recent assessment of the science of climate change,68 
Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman reiterated the Bush 
Administration’s position that “the imposition of a carbon cap in this 
country would . . . lead to the transfer of jobs and industries abroad 
that do not have such carbon caps.”69 Again, conspicuously absent is 
mention of the many, many potential victims and costs of climate 
change.70 
 It would thus be a mistake to say that an economic debate has 
replaced an emotional debate about the victims and beneficiaries of 
environmental regulation. Cost-benefit analysis has become a well-
established practice in federal environmental regulation, having 
been the subject of an executive order in every administration since 
the Reagan administration, including President Clinton’s.71 But the 
                                                                                                                     
 64. President Bush’s opposition to mandatory limits to greenhouse gas emissions in 
the U.S. has been based upon his stated concern that it will hurt the U.S. economy. Justin 
Blum, Senate Rejects Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at A8.  
 65. Id. (“ ‘My first priority is protecting our families and workers,’ said Sen. 
Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.). The amendment, he added, ‘will hurt our families, hurt our 
nation’s energy security, drive jobs overseas.’ ”). 
 66. Big Business Pushes Bush on Carbon Caps, CBS NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/23/business/main2387501.shtml?source=RSSattr=
HOME_2387501 (describing how Bush has “refused in the past to enact legislation that 
would impose mandatory caps on carbon emissions, claiming the move would hurt 
American business”). 
 67. Similarly, in Canada, when a motion was passed in the House of Commons calling 
for steep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, Labor Minister Jean-Pierre Blackburn said, “If 
we took drastic measures to the point that companies had to close, that would not be 
right.” Canada’s House Backs Steep Emissions Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at A19. 
 68. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (Feb. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.aaas.org/news/press_room/climate_change/media/4th_spm2feb07.pdf 
[hereinafter 4TH IPCC]. 
 69. Darren Samuelsohn, Bush Officials Insist No Change is Coming on GHG Caps, 
GREENWIRE, Feb. 2, 2007 (on file with author). 
 70. Not to be outdone, the counterargument by Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who along 
with Sen. John McCain sponsored a bill to limit greenhouse gas emissions, warned “[t]he 
real losers here are our children and grandchildren, who, if we don’t act soon, are going to 
inherit a planet that is not going to be as hospitable as the one we were given by our 
parents and grandparents.” Blum, supra note 64, at A8. 
 71. President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 modified the requirement but did not 
abandon cost-benefit analysis. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
President Reagan: Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). President 
George H.W. Bush continued carrying out Executive Order 12,291, and President George 
W. Bush has continued carrying out Executive Order 12,866.  
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many sloppy references to the costs of regulation, without 
consideration of the benefits of regulation, are not cost-benefit 
analyses. Cost-benefit analysis requires a sober look at both sides of 
the ledger.72 The fixation on the costs of environmental protection, as 
a rhetorical tool, is still an appeal to sympathies for people that are 
more identifiable than those people that would be helped by laws or 
regulations focusing on environmental protection. 
 This Article is written from an anthropogenic point of view. For 
every environmental or ecological problem, I assume that there are 
human interests involved, even if the connection appears tenuous. 
While the preservation of rare and endangered species raises 
significant moral questions, it also implicates human welfare. The 
collapse of ecosystems due to the extinction of some keystone 
species73 may ultimately have very important human consequences, 
whether it be the loss of an important pharmaceutical resource,74 the 
loss of important ecosystem services,75 or just the loss of a 
recreational or aesthetic resource.76 While the moral questions are 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Judge Richard Posner has recently dedicated the better part of a book to a cost-
benefit analysis of climate regulation, concluding somewhat informally that regulation is 
badly needed. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004). The 
most recent and probably the most authoritative analysis is the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Global Climate Change, conducted by the Treasury of the United Kingdom, 
which concluded that failure to act would amount to losing 5-20% of GDP forever, whereas 
taking actions to avoid climate change would cost less than 1% of GDP. STERN REVIEW, 
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, at x, xii-xiii, available 
at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/Executive_Summary.pdf.  
 73. A keystone species is one that is particularly important to its home ecosystem, 
such that its removal would bring about a profound change in the makeup of the 
ecosystem. It is a species “whose impact on its community or ecosystem is large, and 
disproportionately large relative to its abundance.” Mary E. Power et al., Challenges in the 
Quest for Keystones, 46 BIOSCIENCE 609, 609 (1996); see also Keystone Species—Why 
Prairie Dogs Are So Important, http://www.prairiedogs.org/keystone.html (“A keystone 
species is a species whose very presence contributes to a diversity of life and whose 
extinction would consequently lead to the extinction of other forms of life. Keystone species 
help to support the ecosystem (entire community of life) of which they are a part.”) (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81. 
 75. For example, wetlands provide a variety of tangible services, such as water 
purification, groundwater recharge, and floodwater buffering. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, 
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 612 
(2000). 
 76. For example, the multiple environmental threats facing the Great Barrier Reef, 
including warming ocean waters, threaten the viability of a possibly critical ecosystem in 
the Southern Pacific Ocean, but also threaten the tourism industry that receives two 
million tourists and five million recreational visitors each year. Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Authority: Tourism and Recreation, http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/key 
_issues/tourism (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority: 
Overview—The Current Status of the Great Barrier Reef: Feb 2006, 
http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/info_services/publications/sotr/overview (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2008) (“[S]ince 1998, the Great Barrier Reef has suffered its two worst ever 
recorded coral bleaching events, caused by unusually hot sea water . . . .”). 
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important, I raise the human welfare implications—the interests of 
unidentifiable individuals—as a minimum basis for concern.  
IV.   INCIDENTAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES 
 This Article explores the manifestations of identifiability bias in 
law and lawmaking and considers two ways in which the bias 
influences environmental law and policy: incidental identifiability 
bias, in which direct identifications of individuals or groups are 
invoked in specific, discrete instances to advance a particular policy; 
and structural identifiability bias, in which certain legal doctrines or 
institutions are established in such a way as to systematically 
discount the welfare of unidentifiable stakeholders. While incidental 
identifiability bias is easily recognizable and potentially susceptible 
to a remedy, structural identifiability bias challenges some of our 
core values of representative democracy and judicial restraint. This 
Article restricts its analysis and proposals to those identifiability 
biases, incidental and structural, that affect environmental law and 
policymaking. Addressing the many other identifiability biases 
across our democratic and judicial systems is a task left for future 
scholarship. 
 Incidental identifiability biases against environmental law can be 
seen in legislative, judicial, and administrative lawmaking. 
Identifiability crops up as a policy factor simply because of its 
rhetorical power. In the following examples, the identifiability bias 
plays a direct role in a conflict-specific, or “incidental,” way.  
A.   Bias in Legislatures 
 U.S. Congressional debates are replete with poignant references 
to specific individuals, held up as exemplar victims of a capricious 
government bureaucracy, or some other symbol of the need to curb 
and limit environmental regulation. One of the most potent 
rhetorical weapons of those opposed to environmental and ecological 
protection has been the invocation of the noble logger, rancher, 
farmer, miner, fisherman, or factory worker as a symbol of the dear 
price that must be paid for environmental protection. Note that this 
mode of rhetoric is effective under three of the theories of 
identifiability:  
• Vividness, because it is easy to conjure up in one’s mind 
what these people look like, and the difficult physical 
conditions under which they often labor;  
• Reference group, because these references are to a 
specific industry or a specific community highly 
dependent upon an industry; and  
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• Certainty, because of the perceived certainty that some 
people will lose their jobs, as opposed to the perception 
that environmental benefits are still somewhat 
unproven. 
 These references need not be highly specific to raise the 
identifiability of an individual or a group. A reference to “timber 
families” or “ranching communities” is sufficient to raise 
identifiability and evoke an emotional response.77 Experiments by 
psychologists of how much people were willing to help others have 
shown that even seemingly insignificant amounts of information, 
such as an identification number without a name, were sufficient to 
increase a person’s willingness to pay to help.78 
 Conservation of biological diversity has been especially hampered 
by an identifiability bias. While the noble loggers, ranchers, and 
others have always been easy to identify and paint, the beneficiaries 
of biological diversity are extremely difficult to identify. We know 
that many important pharmaceutical discoveries are derived from 
plants and wildlife that are sometimes at risk of extinction, such as 
the ugly Pacific Yew tree, which yields the breast cancer-fighting 
compound taxol,79 or the rosy periwinkle, which produces compounds 
that are effective in fighting leukemia, Hodgkin’s disease, and 
                                                                                                                     
 77. For example: 
That preservation [law] has wreaked incomprehensible havoc on timber 
families who have had to live with prolonged uncertainty about their 
futures. All indices of human despair have gone through the roof in these 
communities: child abuse, spousal abuse, alcohol and substance abuse, 
divorce, adolescent depression and suicide attempts, bankruptcies, and 
illness. 
138 CONG. REC. S16941 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
Is it our intention to mindlessly punish communities that mine coal or 
produce steel or chemicals or automobiles? . . . These are also real people 
with real families—men and women who do hard, dirty, and often 
dangerous work. Are we to punish certain regions because of some sort of 
legislated value judgment about who is responsible for the quality of our 
air? 
136 CONG.REC. S531-01 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1990) (statement of Sen. Byrd). In his account of 
the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Gary Bryner wrote that during the 
floor debates over the Clean Air Act Amendments “Byrd held the floor during much of the 
week of March 19, describing in detail the lives and deaths of coal miners.” GARY BRYNER, 
BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990, 105 (1993). 
I rise in defense of the people of the 2nd District of Maine, and especially 
the loggers, the farmers, and the fishermen of Washington County. 
Unemployment there recently nudged above 10 percent. The traditional 
uses of land, the jobs they depend upon, and the families that need those 
paychecks are under fire . . . . [M]y constituents feel besieged by a Federal 
proposal to list as endangered Atlantic salmon in the rivers of the region. A 
listing would strain the economy which is based on natural resources. 
146 CONG. REC. H1105-06 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2000) (statement of Rep. Baldacci). 
 78. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 79. University of Maryland Medical Center, Breast Cancer: About Taxol, 
http://www.umm.edu/breast/taxol.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
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testicular cancer.80 Both of these plant species narrowly averted 
extinction.81 The beneficiaries of biological diversity are all of 
humankind. This not only dilutes the importance of biological 
diversity, but reduces identifiability in exactly the opposite way that 
the identifiability of loggers, ranchers, and others are amplified:  
• Vividness, because it is impossible to imagine the face of 
person with a disease that would be cured by a 
compound produced by some rare plant or wildlife 
species;  
• Reference group, because the reference group of “all of 
humankind” is as large as it can possibly be; and 
• Certainty, because the probability of any one rare plant 
or wildlife species that stands in the path of development 
would yield a life-saving compound is apt to be low, 
causing people to underweight its importance. 
 As a society, we discount the importance of biological diversity 
because although we rationally know that lives will be saved by 
conserving biological diversity, these beneficiary lives are statistical 
and abstract, and from our perspective, somewhat uncertain. We also 
discount it because the long development timeline of most drugs 
exists far into the future. For policy purposes, they might as well not 
exist at all. 
 Can identifying an environmental perpetrator rally emotional 
forces around the cause of punishing a wrongdoer? Recall that the 
identifiability effect can cut both ways—stimulating an instinct to 
punish as well as to help. In egregious and discrete cases of midnight 
dumping of toxic wastes, for example, where an individual is clearly 
identified and is caught doing something clearly wrongful, 
identifiability serves to excite our instinct to punish. However, in the 
endangered species context, where the leading causes of extinction 
are habitat loss,82 isolating a wrongdoer is deeply problematic. 
Similarly, in a pollution context, where there are thousands, perhaps 
millions, of contributors to the air pollution problem (including 
ourselves as we drive motor vehicles), the causal link that is required 
to identify a wrongdoer is virtually impossible to establish. So, 
despite the existence of an occasional environmental villain, the 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Herbs2000.com, Rosy Periwinkle, http://www.herbs2000.com/herbs/herbs_ 
periwinkle.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 81. New Source of Cancer Drug Spares Yew Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at 1-16; 
Cincinnati Zoo & Botanical Garden, Planting Seeds for the Future, 
http://cincinnatizoo.org/Exhibits/GardenBest/PlantingSeeds/plantingseeds.html (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 82. See, e.g., PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
AND SYNTHESIS, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 20 (2000), available at 
http://www.aibs.org/bookstore/resources/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf.  
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identifiability effect is not generally going to be one that excites our 
impulses to punish environmental wrongdoing. 
 The identifiability bias has played a prominent role in the U.S. 
Congress in its deliberations on conserving biological diversity. In 
1995, a barrage of congressional criticism about the economic and 
social effects of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), both on the floors 
of the House and Senate and during a series of impromptu hearings 
held in rural areas, spelled trouble for the ESA.83 The hearings were 
naked attempts to publicize the hardships supposedly suffered by 
landowners, farmers, loggers, and other stakeholders negatively 
impacted by ESA regulations.84 Numerous attempts to repeal or 
substantially amend the ESA were proposed in 1995 and 1996,85 and 
it was only the surprising intervention of House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich that prevented their passage.86 As it turns out, Gingrich, 
the conservative architect of the Contract With America, aspired as a 
youngster to be a zookeeper.87 In a meeting with Michael Bean, the 
noted environmental attorney, and Edward O. Wilson, the eminent 
Harvard ecologist, Gingrich promised he would continue to use his 
post as Speaker to prevent the ESA reform proposals from reaching 
the House floor.88 In parting, however, he warned that conservative 
interest groups and his Republican colleagues, armed with personal 
interest stories of beleaguered ranchers and farmers, were “turning 
up the heat.”89 In fact, these ESA reformers did succeed in 
legislatively imposing a moratorium on new listings of species under 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Rep. Richard Pombo of California helped establish an Endangered Species 
Committee in 1995 to hold hearings throughout the western U.S. on the economic and 
social effects of the ESA. Pombo unapologetically orchestrated the hearings into rallies of 
farmers, ranchers, and loggers that felt threatened by ESA regulation, arguing that for 
years, the ESA debate had been stacked against them, and that it was now their turn. See 
Nancy Vogel, Environmental Law Attacked: Foes Rip Endangered Species Act, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 29, 1995, at A1; David Horsey, Greens on the Run; GOP Wave 
Threating Environmental Regulations, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCIER, Nov. 5, 1995, at 
E1. 
 84. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and 
a Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 52-53 (2002). 
 85. See, for example, H.R. 2364, 104th Cong. (1995), sponsored by Rep. Shadegg (R-
AZ), which would have made the ESA a strictly voluntary law; Rep H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. 
(1995), sponsored by Rep. Young (R-AK), which would have limited regulation under the 
ESA to direct physical harming of endangered species; H.R. 2490, 104th Cong. (1995), 
sponsored by Reps. Tauzin (R-LA) and Fields (R-TX), which would have required external 
peer review before the listing of any species under the ESA; and S. 768, 104th Cong. 
(1995), sponsored by Sen. Gorton (R-WA), which would have reversed the citizen suit 
provision to be available only to those economically harmed by regulation. 
 86. Michael J. Bean, The Gingrich That Saved the ESA, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 
26, 30. 
 87. Id. at 27. 
 88. Id. at 30. 
 89.   Id. at 30-31. 
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the ESA for a period of six months. 90 To the optimist, the failure of 
detractors of the ESA to overturn it is certainly a success; however, 
there have been no attempts to strengthen and improve the ESA, 
and this is due largely to the virulent opposition to the ESA. 
 It should surprise no one that legislatures invite references to 
identifiable individuals. Legislatures are, after all, bodies of elected 
representatives; legislators are supposed to identify their 
constituents and protect and advance their interests. In fact, a public 
choice theorist might go further and argue that these interests make 
it a matter of self-interest for legislators to protect and advance their 
interests. To be sure, a theory of identifiability bias overlaps with 
public choice theory. Public choice theorists would certainly agree 
that certain economically powerful constituents are much more 
salient to the legislators, if only because of the monetary incentives 
they provide to legislators who represent them. This is not 
inconsistent with the theory of identifiability. Rather, the 
monetization is simply another form of identifiability and serves as a 
way of keeping legislative attention on the powerful constituents, 
even if they are not mentioned by name on the floor of the House or 
Senate.  
 However, even the most vigorous public choice theorists would 
agree that their theory does not explain all legislative action.91 The 
vast majority of lawmaking activities that take place daily cannot be 
accurately modeled by a rational actor model. Beliefs about public 
policy clearly matter.92 A theory of identifiability can account for not 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, 
Publ. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-156, 1321-159 to -160 (1996). 
 91. Perhaps the strongest adherent of public choice theory is Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, who wrote that “[m]y theme is tendencies, not truths. No one approach can 
explain all decisions.” Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1984); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding 
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223, 228 (1986). 
The arguments in this [a]rticle do not hinge on an assumption that all 
legislation is best explained as self-serving behavior narrowly construed. 
Indeed, they assume not only that laws are passed for a wide variety of 
reasons, but also that, as a general matter, it is impossible for judges to 
reconstruct the complex array of motives that prompted the passage of a 
particular statute. Some legislation serves the public interest by 
maximizing society’s welfare from an economic perspective.  
Id.  
 92. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 893-98 (1987). As a stark contrast to public choice, the 
advocacy coalition framework posits that political actors (with ability to influence policy) 
will form and break coalitions with other political actors, some with similar political 
beliefs, and some not, but ultimately for the end of some political goal consistent with their 
political beliefs. See, e.g., Paul A. Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy 
Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein, 21 POL’Y SCI. 129, 131 (1988); 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Analytical Debates and Policy Learning: Analysis and Change in 
the Federal Bureaucracy, 21 POL’Y SCI. 169, 170-71 (1988).  
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only those lawmaking actions that public choice theorists model, but 
also those for which a sincere desire to make the right decision is the 
objective. Even such well-intentioned decisions, this Article argues, 
can be unduly influenced by differential identifiability of 
stakeholders.  
B.   Bias in the Judiciary 
 The identifiability bias insinuates itself into judicial 
decisionmaking as well. While judges are not elected to represent 
constituents as legislators are, their cases are still intensely focused 
on the parties before them. Unless the law relevant to the case has 
some built-in protection for unidentifiable persons, judges are still 
apt to think first about the rights and obligations of those appearing 
before them. 
 For example, the progression of American regulatory takings 
jurisprudence into a complex assessment of the expectations of the 
property owner smacks of a judicial obsession with fairness to the 
property owner, usually an identifiable individual plaintiff bringing 
her case before the court. Whereas the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, by its terms, contemplates only the physical 
confiscation of property as a compensable governmental action, 
modern takings jurisprudence has expanded into the realm of 
“regulatory takings”—cases in which compensation is sought for a 
regulation that devalues property, rather than physically confiscates 
it.93 Earlier cases undertook extensive reviews of cases in 
determining the extent of the police power94 and abstained from 
analyzing the effects upon persons whose property was regulated.95 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City sets forth three factors that are 
to be considered in an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y].” 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The 
three factors, which seem to represent the midpoint of a shift from a focus on the 
governmental action to a focus on the claimant, are: (i) the economic impact upon the 
claimant, (ii) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed 
expectations, and (iii) the character of the governmental action. Id. While Penn Central 
remains good law, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to have abandoned 
any analysis of the last factor in favor of the first two. Stephen J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise 
of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 437 (2000). Although the article 
argues that investment-backed expectations have become the “prime determinant of what 
constitutes ‘property,’ ” it is obvious that the impact of frustrating such expectations is 
focused upon the economic effects on the claimant. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1928) (upholding a 
municipal zoning law, despite its effect of severely reducing the value of a parcel previously 
zoned as industrial); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a Kansas 
prohibition on the production and sale of alcoholic beverages). 
 95. See, for example, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, which upheld a Los Angeles city 
ordinance prohibiting the construction of brickyards and brick kilns and explicitly rejected 
consideration of the well-averred financial hardship imposed upon the plaintiff, who had 
purchased land with the expectation of mining the clay for a brick kiln. 239 U.S. 394, 410 
(1915). The Court held simply that the prohibition was well within the ambit of the police 
power, and it dismissed considerations of the impact on the claimant. Id. “[The police 
2008]                          THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS 457 
 
Not only have courts strayed from an inquiry into the nature of the 
governmental action, but they have become obsessed with 
determining the reasonableness of a property owner’s expectation of 
being free from regulation. Regulatory takings cases have become 
focused almost completely on the property owner, asking whether the 
complained-of regulation was fair to the property owner.96 This drift 
away from the terms of the Constitution and toward a bias in favor of 
property owners is driven by the identifiability bias. 
 Even more troubling for environmentalists is the skill with which 
property rights organizations litigating regulatory takings cases have 
been able to troll for “sympathetic plaintiffs”—plaintiffs toward 
whom juries would have a greater degree of compassion. Hence, 
landmark regulatory takings cases have been brought on behalf of an 
eighty-two-year-old widow hoping to realize her late husband’s 
dream to develop their Lake Tahoe streamside property,97 a small-
town hardware store owner wishing to pave her parking lot and 
expand her store,98 and a “lifelong resident” of a town in which the 
resident hoped to develop a three-acre wetland into residential 
housing units.99 Clearly, property rights organizations such as the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
and the Defenders of Property Rights have figured out the 
identifiability bias and have begun using it to their advantage.100 
 The identifiability effect perhaps reared its head most 
prominently in and after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. 
City of New London,101 in which the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld 
the city’s taking of private property to further economic development 
in an effort to revitalize its downtown area.102 Compensation was not 
at issue, only the meaning of whether such a redevelopment plant 
constituted a “public use” that justified the city’s exercise of the 
eminent domain power.103 Justice O’Connor’s bitter dissent chided 
                                                                                                                     
power] may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the 
imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted 
arbitrarily.” Id.  
 96. For example, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., the Court 
held that repeated denials of building permits by the city were unfair and repetitive land 
use procedure, constituting a compensable taking. 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999). In Palazollo v. 
Rhode Island, the Court held that a post-regulation transfer did not preclude a finding 
that the property owner’s expectation of development was “reasonable.” 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(2001). 
 97. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1997). 
 98. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994). 
 99. See Palazzollo, 533 U.S. at 613.  
 100. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance, An Antidote to Wetland Loss, 
Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (explaining the “sanctifying” of 
property owners). 
 101. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 102. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 477. 
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the majority for “wash[ing] out any distinction between private and 
public use of property—and thereby effectively [] delet[ing] the words 
‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”104 
Her dissenting opinion also made a point of noting that: 
Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery . . . lives in a house on Walbach 
Street that has been in her family for over 100 years. She 
was born in the house in 1918; her husband, petitioner 
Charles Dery, moved into the house when they married in 
1946. Their son lives next door with his family in the house 
he received as a wedding gift . . . .105  
 It is unclear what the role of this personal description plays in 
the jurisprudence of eminent domain, but it appears to have moved 
Justice O’Connor. Her dissent fueled a sharp reaction from the 
property rights movement106 and spawned a flurry of state activity 
protecting or purporting to protect property owners from another 
Kelo;107 this despite the fact that Kelo was not a landmark case and 
was fairly consistent with current jurisprudence on eminent 
domain.108 In the aftermath of Kelo, Alabama, Texas, Delaware, and 
Ohio enacted legislation that, to varying degrees, constrain the 
ability of municipalities to take property by eminent domain. At least 
eighteen other states subsequently proposed legislation.109 Some of 
these state initiatives change relatively little, while others may truly 
constrain eminent domain powers.110 But, in all cases, state 
legislatures have wanted to at least appear to have taken action. 
C.   Bias in Administrative Agencies 
 In the regulatory arena, the general notion of “regulatory capture” 
is one that has been studied in a number of different settings, one of 
which is the relationship between field office regulators and 
individual or small-group regulated parties.111 A special form of 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 494-95. 
 106. Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006). 
 107. Id. at 830-39. 
 108. Id. at 803. 
 109. Id. at 830-36. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The notion of regulatory capture is that regulatory agencies respond to the 
regulated entities rather than act in the public interest. Theories abound as to the exact 
mechanism of how this might take place. One is that repeated regulatory encounters 
between regulators and regulated entities, where each has some means of punishing and 
rewarding the other, will give rise to implicit cooperation. IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, ch. 3 
(1992). Another theory of capture stems from George J. Stigler’s The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, which demonstrated how industries may lobby for and acquire regulation 
when it serves to insulate them from competition. 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
Finally, a “revolving door” system of regulation in which regulators are employed by the 
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capture exists in agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) or the United States Forest Service, which rely heavily upon 
field offices to carry out federal policies.112 Policies, even if driven 
from Washington, D.C., are thus the responsibility of local field 
officials to carry out, and they have a significant amount of discretion 
in doing so.113 These local officials face a strong temptation to 
interpret their regulatory mandate in such a way as to fit local 
norms.114 Where field officials are members of the community and 
identify more strongly with the community than with Washington 
bureaucrats, and where field officers deal much more regularly with 
regulated parties than with superiors in Washington, D.C., there is a 
natural tendency to view the problem from the point of view of the 
local community.115 The local view would be that federal policy 
protecting the environment or ecology claims identifiable victims of 
some capricious regulatory policy concocted by a distant federal 
bureaucrat. Incidents of identifiability bias are thus common in field 
officials that adopt a local view and adjust or enforce policies flexibly, 
ignoring or suppressing the fact that their sympathy with the local 
community comes at the expense of the more diffuse and less 
identifiable public interest.  
 For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel,116 an 
environmental organization sued the BLM for adopting a range 
management plan based on an environmental impact statement that 
did not consider the alternative of eliminating grazing permits 
altogether and only contained one alternative that even 
contemplated a modest reduction in grazing.117 The organization 
argued that under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
under which the environmental impact statement was conducted, 
this omission was inexplicable given the extremely arid and 
unfavorable conditions for grazing on this particular area of federal 
land.118 The court upheld the BLM’s actions in every regard, 
including its cursory environmental impact statement.119 While not 
obviously incorrect in its decision—a rule of reason standard may 
support the BLM’s actions—the court paid very short shrift to the 
proposition that grazing might be eliminated altogether. The court 
cited the BLM’s environmental impact statement, stating that 
                                                                                                                     
regulated entities after the regulator leaves the government is one in which the potential 
for capture is obvious. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology 
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 569 (2002).  
 112. PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS 199-204 (1960). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985). 
 117. Id. at 1052. 
 118. Id. at 1053. 
 119. Id. at 1063.  
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[t]he complete abandonment of grazing in the Reno planning 
area is practically unthinkable as a policy choice; it would 
involve monetary losses to the ranching community alone of 
nearly 4 million dollars and 290 jobs, not to mention 
unquantifiable social impacts. Of course, compared with the 
economy of the Reno area as a whole, ranching plays only a 
negligible role. Nevertheless, eliminating all grazing would 
have extreme impacts on this small community. A “no 
grazing” policy is simply not a “reasonable alternative” for 
this particular area.120 
 This court was upholding what is a fairly widespread practice in 
the BLM to favor local interests that are resource-consuming, such 
as ranching, overconservation, and recreation interests.121 Aided by 
statutes that were sufficiently vague122 to allow a great deal of 
discretion for field managers, the BLM has frequently given short 
shrift to less identifiable individuals, those that benefit from 
preservation, and even recreationists, who would be much less 
present than ranchers and others that engage in consumptive uses of 
BLM land. 
 It is worth noting that the regulatory capture literature has 
extensively studied the types of interactions described above. But 
again, as a cousin of public choice theory, most of the explanation for 
capture revolves around the self-interest motivation of regulatory 
officials: the need to obtain information from regulated parties,123 the 
threat of reprisal from powerful congressional representatives that 
are supported by the regulated parties,124 and the “revolving door” 
theory that regulators often leave government employment for a job 
in the sector that they regulated.125 These three explanations, 
however, do not explain all of the cases of regulatory capture. The 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 1054 (citations omitted).  
 121. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why 
“Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 422-27 (1994); Joseph M. Feller, The 
Comb Wash Case: The Rule of Law Comes to the Public Rangelands, 17 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 25, 28 (1996); Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public 
Lands: Opening the Process to Public Participation, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 571-77 
(1991) [hereinafter Feller, Grazing Management]. 
 122. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988), 
provides that “resource management plans” be drawn up for each district under the 
jurisdiction of the BLM, in accordance with “multiple use” objectives, including grazing, 
preservation, recreation, and other uses. While the statute contemplated management of 
BLM lands for all of these uses, virtually none of the plans have any true grazing 
management plans, only grazing allowances, allowing ranchers to graze on federal lands 
without any ecological restrictions whatsoever. Feller, Grazing Management, supra note 
121, at 577-78. 
 123. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and 
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280-88 (2004). 
 124. Blumm, supra note 121, at 419, n.85. 
 125. William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 665, 666, 681-82 (1979). 
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question of exactly what monetary incentives truly bear on the 
everyday decisions of a field official are not fully explained by a 
rational economic actor model that underlies the regulatory capture 
literature. It is implausible that every field official making hundreds 
of mundane daily decisions is controlled by monetary self-interest. 
Ontario Health Minister George Smitherman’s bold move is one 
example. Hundreds, perhaps thousands more take place every day. 
To some extent, there must be some psychological factors at work 
that are not accounted for in regulatory capture theory or public 
choice theory. 
V.   STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES 
 As opposed to incidental identifiability biases, in which the direct 
invocation of individuals or groups tilts a particular decision in favor 
of those individuals or groups, structural identifiability biases are 
those institutions, practices, and doctrines that are established in 
such a way as to intentionally favor certain individuals or groups. 
Typically, these institutions, practices, and doctrines reflect 
fundamental values that ensure that individuals or groups are 
treated fairly in political and legal systems. But, by focusing on 
fairness to certain individuals or groups, attention and resources are 
naturally drawn away from those that are not identified as those 
beneficiary individuals or groups. In other cases, structural 
identifiability biases stem from our fundamental notions of 
separation of powers and perhaps some larger sense of how 
government is supposed to work. In liberal democratic systems, both 
of these biases are deeply ingrained in our political culture and 
therefore serve to systemically work to the disadvantage of 
unidentifiable individuals and groups. Because some of these 
institutions, practices, and doctrines are so fundamental, the 
identifiability bias inheres without much alarm on our part as to the 
missing, unidentifiable constituents. As with the discussion on 
incidental identifiability biases, this Article examines some examples 
of structural biases occurring in legislative, judicial, and 
administrative contexts. 
A.   Bias in Legislatures – Grandfathering 
 Grandfathering is the practice of exempting existing polluters or 
land uses from new laws or regulations that would otherwise render 
them unlawful.126 It is based upon a reluctance to impose new laws 
and regulations upon costly investments and a reluctance to interfere 
with otherwise legitimate expectations of an investor in an existing 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10095, 10096 (2006). 
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legal regime.127 Grandfathering is the legal expression of an instinct 
so basic to liberal values in democratic societies that it has woven 
itself into all manner of regulation, environmental and otherwise. 128  
 As noted in passing above, the regulatory takings inquiry has 
become an inquiry into whether, among other things, the regulation 
frustrates a landowner’s “investment-backed expectations,”129 
implying that a regulation may require compensation if the 
landowner could not have foreseen a new land use regulation. This is 
a form of grandfathering: the legal recognition, even 
constitutionalization, of rights to continue doing what one was doing. 
A more explicit example is the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
creating the New Source Review regulatory program, which requires 
the installation of state-of-the-art pollution control equipment 
whenever a new air-polluting facility is constructed.130 Importantly, 
New Source Review did not apply to existing facilities, on the theory 
that sudden and expensive regulatory changes frustrated their 
investment expectations.131 In another example involving large 
investments, the debate over electricity deregulation was influenced 
by three prominent economists who argued that it was necessary to 
compensate and protect the owners of “stranded facilities,” power 
plants that are so inefficient that they would be unable to compete in 
deregulated retail electricity markets.132 While electricity 
deregulation is still a story without an ending, it is clear that the 
owners of existing power plants will have a very large hand in 
writing it. A final example of grandfathering in land uses is the 
common practice in local land use regulations of permitting variances 
and nonconforming uses; in cases of hardship, these permit 
deviations from general land use plans that are otherwise binding on 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and 
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1677 (2007) (examining grandfathering in the context of environmental legislation 
and regulations). 
 129. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also 
supra text accompanying note 93. 
 130. Clean Air Act §§ 165(a)(4), 173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2) (2000).  
 131. It was also argued that installing pollution control equipment was much more 
efficiently done at the new construction stage, rather than patched on at some point in the 
middle of a plant’s life. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON CHANGES IN NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES OF 
AIR POLLUTANTS 35 (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309095786/html/ 
(“Supporters assert that it is justified because new sources can most easily incorporate the 
latest pollution control technology.”). 
 132. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., THE CHALLENGE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE 
REGULATORS: TRANSITION FROM REGULATION TO EFFICIENT COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC 
POWER 33 (1995) (on file with author). 
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all other parties in their future land use changes and 
developments.133 
 What lawmakers typically anticipate is that over the course of 
time, the grandfathered nonconformers will gradually phase 
themselves out and new entrants in compliance will replace them.134 
To an extent, this happens. However, some grandfathering situations 
have seen nonconformers hang on for unexpectedly long periods of 
time.135 Grandfathering under New Source Review and the 1977 
amendments still excuse pre-1977 polluters from upgrading or even 
installing pollution control equipment, with the result that many 
power plants that were old and polluting in 1977 are now archaic and 
still polluting.136 In the meantime, what of the beneficiaries of new 
environmental laws and regulations? The pollution that is emitted as 
a result of the 1977 grandfathering continues to affect unidentifiable 
victims, and the reduced ability to regulate land uses is continuing to 
allow development to intrude into wildlife habitat, threatening 
biological diversity. 
 Grandfathering is a tool for dealing with legal transitions, which 
bring together stakeholders in the transition. However, it should be 
no surprise that the stakeholders most vocal and defensive about 
transitions are those that would be disadvantaged by them. 
Grandfathering is a common policy response to these stakeholders. 
Of course, this comes at the expense of the unidentifiable, those that 
would benefit from not grandfathering existing investments into 
older, weaker laws or regulations. 
 Why are liberal democratic societies so adamant about protecting 
people’s expectations to continue doing what they were doing before a 
new law or regulation? It is an insufficient answer to say that 
liberalism emphasizes individual autonomy and rights and is most 
interested in protecting individuals from state oppression, and 
therefore protects people from regulation that they do not foresee.137 
We certainly impute knowledge of the criminal law, new and old, to 
individuals and do not excuse crimes for lack of actual knowledge.138 
In environmental and land use regulations, there is a strong 
                                                                                                                     
 133. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 974-99 (5th ed. 2002). 
 134. BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET 
DISTORTIONS 2 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions from the Electricity Generation 
Industry: Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 435 (2001). 
 135. Hsu, supra note 126, at 10097.  
 136. Hsu, supra note 134, at 434-35. 
 137. See discussion infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text. 
 138. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (“If the ancient maxim that 
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has any residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary 
intent requirement—mens rea—of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act 
is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy.”). 
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compulsion to grandfather because those affected by regulation are 
apt to be few and identifiable, while those that might benefit from 
regulation are many, diverse, and unidentifiable. While criminal 
laws protect a larger society—but also more visibly protect 
identifiable victims (we can all recall specific friends or relatives that 
have been victims of crime, if not ourselves)—environmental and 
natural resource laws protect unidentifiable persons. Moreover, 
recall that identifiability can be a double-edged sword. People are 
more willing to punish identifiable persons that engage in 
wrongdoing.139 Criminal laws help effectuate this impulse, while 
environmental and land use regulations that pick on individuals or 
groups engaged in otherwise lawful activity evoke the “helpfulness” 
identifiability bias, giving rise to an almost irresistible instinct to 
grandfather. 
 A final irony is that while grandfathering is viewed as protecting 
economic investments, the competitive advantage afforded to existing 
polluters often retards economic progress. Because grandfathering is 
a legal exemption, it is a valuable asset and a competitive advantage 
over new entrants that do not enjoy the exemption. Several empirical 
studies have demonstrated that the grandfathering of old emissions 
standards has retarded capital turnover in the power plant 
industry,140 in automobiles,141 and in four air-polluting industries.142 
Since older facilities tend to pollute more, the slowing of capital 
turnover certainly increases pollution;143 but the economic irony is 
that it also makes the industry less economically efficient. Older 
facilities are simply less efficient than newer ones.144  
 A compelling case in point is the electricity generating industry. 
In the 1990s, the economics of new power plant construction was 
such that natural gas-powered plants were much more economical 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See Small & Loewenstein, supra note 28. 
 140. Michael T. Maloney & Gordon L. Brady, Capital Turnover and Marketable 
Pollution Rights, 31 J.L. & ECON. 203 (1988). But see Frank M. Gollup & Marc J. Roberts, 
Environmental Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of Fossil-Fueled Electric 
Power Generation, 91 J. POL. ECON. 654 (1983); Randy A. Nelson et al., Differential 
Environmental Regulation: Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 368 (1993) (casting some doubt on the methodology of Maloney and 
Brady, but reaching a similar conclusion). 
 141. Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions 
Standards, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 328 (1982). 
 142. Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations on 
Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379 (2000). 
 143. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: EMISSIONS FROM OLDER 
ELECTRICITY GENERATING UNITS 2 (2002). 
 144. Id.; TINA KAARSBERG ET AL., NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INST., THE CLEAN AIR-
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY LINK: ENHANCING EFFICIENCY IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 30 
(1999) (“Engine efficiency has accelerated from 30 percent in the 1940s to as high as 50 
percent.”), available at http://www.nemw.org/Section2.pdf . 
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than coal-fired power plants.145 Deregulated natural gas prices were 
low, making natural gas-fired power plants cheaper.146 Meanwhile, 
for coal-fired power plants the cost of controlling emissions of sulfur 
dioxide by installing “scrubbers,” or flue gas desulfurization 
equipment, was high.147 However, the 1990s saw the retirement of 
only seven of the original 263 coal-fired plants originally subjected to 
new regulation under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.148 Why so 
few, when Congress expected that the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments would finally put many of the coal-fired dinosaurs to 
rest?149 The answer is that Congress underestimated the power of the 
economic incentives they had created—by grandfathering—for power 
plants to be patched up and kept running. Legislating an expensive 
regulatory pollution control requirement that only applied to new 
construction created an enormous incentive to maintain existing, 
grandfathered plants.  
 The identifiability bias thus has an economic side as well. While 
legislatures respond to the call of identifiable constituents that 
demand grandfathering of their polluting facilities, they ignore the 
economic interests of new entrants. New entrants invariably have a 
more efficient way of producing what incumbents produce; otherwise 
they would not be seeking to enter the industry. Because of the 
substantial overlap of environmental and economic interests, the 
story of grandfathering in the electricity generating industry not only 
illustrates the identifiability bias against environmental protection, 
but also economic progress.  
B.   Bias in the Judiciary – Standing 
 The question of standing has long been a prickly one for 
environmental plaintiffs. Article III of the Constitution requires 
federal judges to carefully consider whether a plaintiff is the proper 
party to seek relief before a court.150 In order to establish standing to 
sue, a plaintiff must show: 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Hsu, supra note 134, at 434-35. 
 146. Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia 
Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 100 (1997).  
 147. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID 
RAIN PROGRAM 241-42 (2000) (reviewing in 2000 the state of scrubber cost and technology 
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 148. Hsu, supra note 134, at 435. 
 149. BIEWALD ET AL., supra note 134, at 2. 
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whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
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(1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.151  
All three of these elements have posed problems for environmental 
plaintiffs, who have often complained of diffuse, uncertain injuries— 
injuries that are not traceable to specific injurers—and injuries that 
have numerous causes, so that they may not be redressable. All three 
of these elements pose identifiability problems. This is not to say that 
the standing doctrine is misguided—but it is important to recognize 
its systemic propensity to filter out environmental lawsuits, so that 
appropriately narrow solutions can be fashioned.  
1.   Injury in fact 
 In the seminal 1972 case Sierra Club v. Morton,152 the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint by the Sierra 
Club on the grounds that it had not alleged that a planned ski resort 
development would result in an “injury in fact” to actual members of 
the Sierra Club.153 The decision was deemed to be something of a 
victory for the environmental movement because of the recipe laid 
out in the opinion for meeting standing requirements,154 and because 
the Sierra Club was granted leave to amend its complaint to meet 
those requirements, which they did;155 the Sierra Club’s persistence 
ultimately helped derail the proposed ski resort.156 However, the case 
represents a major turning point for environmental litigation in that 
it placed an enduring burden on plaintiffs to show legally cognizable 
harm, insisting on “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” harm.157 For most 
environmental or ecological harms, which tend to be widespread and 
diffuse, it is difficult to identify a specific plaintiff or group of persons 
whom have suffered “concrete and particularized” harm.158 Also, the 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-
81 (2000). 
 152. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 153. Id. at 734-36, 741. 
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nature of some environmental lawsuits are such that they seek to 
prevent some future harm, so that courts might look skeptically at 
whether the harm is “actual or imminent.”159 As Justice Kennedy 
wrote in his concurring opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
Court will not “entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s 
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”160 
 Why is this an identifiability problem? “Concrete and 
particularized” injuries occur to people that are concrete and 
particularized. Unidentifiable individuals are exposed to substantial 
risks that courts have not deemed to be “actual and imminent” 
injuries. The nature of environmental harm is such that it rarely 
attaches to such identifiable individuals, but only populations of 
individuals. Two of the theories of identifiability illustrate how this 
doctrine biases against environmental protection: the diffuse and 
widespread nature of environmental or ecological harms make the 
reference group necessarily large, reducing the human compulsion to 
act; and the proactive nature of most environmental lawsuits renders 
relief ex ante rather than ex post, making relief or preventative 
action seem less compelling. 
 In its recent decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental 
Protection Agency,161 the Court seems to have retreated somewhat 
from the restrictive Lujan approach, albeit by a narrow 5-4 majority. 
Importantly, the Court upheld standing in a case involving the EPA’s 
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, which is perhaps the 
quintessential environmental problem in that it involves diffuse and 
unidentifiable plaintiffs, diffuse and unidentifiable defendants, and 
latency and causation issues. Nevertheless, in focusing upon 
Massachusetts as lead plaintiff, the Court held that Massachusetts, 
as a “quasi-sovereign,”162 had suffered injury-in-fact by virtue of its 
                                                                                                                     
Service to carry out environmental impact statement for tax treatment of methyl tertiary 
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 160. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992). Justice Kennedy 
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Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
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 161. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 162. Id. at 1454. Justice Stevens wrote that “[j]ust as Georgia’s ‘independent interest . . 
. in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so 
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“interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the 
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether 
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants 
shall breathe pure air.”163 The Court continued: “That Massachusetts 
does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ 
only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this 
case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial 
power.”164  
 That the Court found injury-in-fact and upheld standing for 
climate change risks is a very significant victory for 
environmentalists and a noteworthy development in standings 
jurisprudence.165 However, in terms of environmental law, one must 
not lose sight of the fact that it was the state of Massachusetts that 
was deemed to have standing, and largely by virtue of the fact that it 
“own[ed] a great deal” of the territory threatened by climate 
change.166 Would the same result have been obtained for an 
individual? Or a public interest organization? The Court evidently 
felt it necessary to assert that “[o]nly one petitioner needs to have 
standing to authorize review,”167 leaving us to wonder if the 
environmental organization Environmental Defense, a plaintiff to 
the suit, would have had standing had it brought the suit alone.  
 That an “injury-in-fact” requirement, even in light of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, will still be a gatekeeper for now and forever 
is an identifiability bias. The bias exists in the difficulty of 
identifying people that suffer the kinds of injuries caused by 
environmental degradation, as compared with the ease of identifying 
people that suffer economic injuries supposedly caused by 
environmental regulation. In this sense, the bias is a structural one, 
reflecting a bias of our political and constitutional values, and 
favoring tangible, economic harms over less tangible, less 
measurable harms. And it is worth bearing in mind that in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court was swayed by what is now a 
mountain of evidence raising the probability that the accumulation of 
                                                                                                                     
too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.” Id. 
(citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
 163. Id. (citing Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).  
 164. Id.  
 165. Before Massachusetts v. EPA, the question had been one of great interest among 
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547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)). 
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greenhouse gases poses substantial risks.168 Had this suit been 
brought just ten years ago when the science of climate change was 
quite alarming but not as conclusive—remember that the 1987 
Climate Protection Act required EPA to develop a national policy169—
it is far from clear that the same result with respect to standing 
would have been obtained. It is the nature of the “facts” which need 
to seem plausible to establish “injury-in-fact” that act as the court 
gatekeeper and that keep out some environmental lawsuits that 
should be heard. 
2.   Traceability to Action of Defendant 
 The second requirement of the standing test, that an injury be 
traceable to the defendant, is really an unidentifiability problem: it is 
very often impossible for victims of pollution or other environmental 
or ecological insult to identify their perpetrators. Air and water 
pollution usually have many emitters, ecological degradation and 
wildlife habitat loss, many infringers. Identifying them and tracing 
them to an alleged injury is an essential pleading requirement.
 Modern realities may have eroded the traceability bar. The 
seminal tort case Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories170 created a “market 
share” theory of liability that enables plaintiffs to hold defendants 
liable for a defective product in proportion to the defendants’ market 
shares, if the product in question is produced by all defendants in 
accordance with the same formula.171 This theory of liability, while 
sometimes questioned,172 has nevertheless held up over time. In 
Agency for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of 
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A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a 
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For 
when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the 
ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape 
of reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—
of a “greenhouse gas.” 
 Id. Justice Stevens’s opinion goes on to survey the many climate change reports and 
studies over several decades submitted by plaintiffs, and concludes in its holding on 
standing that “petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the 
most demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both actual and 
imminent.” Id. at 1455 (internal quotations omitted). 
 169. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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Florida, Inc.,173 the Florida Supreme Court upheld a state statute’s 
allowance of a market-share theory of liability as applied to tobacco 
manufacturers,174 permitting plaintiffs to recover against the 
defendants based on defendants’ market share in tobacco products.175  
 A possible extension of Sindell and Agency for Health Care 
Administration would be to impose liability on polluters based on a 
share of pollution.176 It is conceivable that a statutorily created cause 
of action for pollution share liability would similarly be upheld. This 
would require, however, that there be some linearity between 
pollution and harm, and that, as in the case of some air pollutants, 
there be fairly extensively and deeply studied pollutants such as fine 
particulate matter.177 
 As a general matter, the traceability prong of the standing inquiry 
remains a hurdle. Courts have shown some willingness to entertain 
novel theories on liability such as market share liability, even if 
courts have indicated a willingness to defer to legislatures in creating 
statutory remedies. However, the traceability prong still seems very 
important from a due process point of view. In that sense, this 
requirement, in that it reflects a fundamental value of our notion of 
justice, is a structural identifiability bias. Again, this is not to say 
that it is misplaced. But insofar as the traceability requirement 
systematically filters out environmental lawsuits, it is a bias that 
requires that the doctrine of standing be tweaked. 
3.   Redressability 
 The standing requirement that a plaintiff suffer a harm that is 
redressable is, in some ways, another way of establishing 
causation,178 and as such, poses an identifiability bias. The way that 
the redressability requirement biases environmental law is similar to 
the way that the traceability requirement does: it filters out claims in 
which the link between polluter and victim is probabilistic or 
statistical in nature. Redressability is an even finer filter, however. 
Not only must there be some sort of a link between polluter and 
victim, but the claim must be such that the court can afford a remedy 
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to the victim.179 With truly widespread pollution problems, such as 
global climate change, the difficulty of identifying not only the 
victims but also the defendants is manifest.  
 Enter Massachusetts v. EPA.180 In holding that the EPA’s refusal 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, which 
account for about six percent of global carbon dioxide emissions,181 
was a redressable harm, the Court swept away much of the 
identifiability bias embodied in the redressability requirement. 
Significantly, the Court held that “regulating motor-vehicle 
emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, [but] it by no 
means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a 
duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”182 Apparently, redressability 
no longer means that the court must be able to afford the plaintiff a 
complete remedy, something that would be impossible in most 
environmental disputes. 
 Before celebrating the victory for environmentalists, it is worth 
noting the reliance of the Court on the Clean Air Act’s judicial review 
provision, which provides a right to petition for review of a long list 
of administrative transgressions.183 The Court wrote that “a litigant 
to whom Congress has accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests . . . here, the right to challenge agency action 
unlawfully withheld . . . can assert that right without meeting all the 
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”184 The Court 
perhaps consciously limits its holding to those situations where 
Congress has spoken—and has by statute pronounced that some 
environmental harms shall be considered redressable. While most 
other federal environmental statutes provide rights to seek judicial 
review of administrative decisions or to bring citizen suits to enforce 
non-discretionary lapses of administration,185 injuries not connected 
with a federal statute may not be considered redressable if, as is the 
case for most environmental injuries, the injurers are many and 
therefore unidentifiable. 
4.   Standing Requirements: A Filter as a Structural Bias 
 Standing has been historically important in filtering out lawsuits 
with many plaintiffs on the theory that no single plaintiff can 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-63 (1992). 
 180. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  
 181. Id. at 1458. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006). 
 184. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 185. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. §1365 (2000); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000); 
Toxic Substances Control Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act 
§§ 207(e)-207(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2647(e)-2647(f) (2000). 
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adequately represent the interests of everyone and no court can 
adequately adjudicate the rights of so many not appearing before 
it.186 From one constitutional perspective, one championed by Justice 
Scalia,187 legislatures are the appropriate bodies to deal with such 
questions, being elected bodies and having at their disposal greater 
fact-finding resources.188 Under this view, an identifiability bias 
against widespread environmental harm is an appropriate reflection 
of our notions of judicial modesty and judicial economy—notions that 
are fundamental to our separation of powers.  
 But certainly the judiciary is not meant to punt all of these types 
of questions to legislatures. For one thing, the entire corpus of 
administrative law pertains to adjudications that, in some way, affect 
large classes of individuals with potentially disparate sets of 
interests, environmental interests being one of them.189 The question 
then becomes to what extent our notions of judicial modesty and 
judicial economy conflict with our notion of the universality of 
justice.  
 The Court itself has wondered whether standing is truly a 
constitutional bar or a rule of self-restraint which, if counterbalanced 
by sufficiently compelling policy considerations, could be broken.190 
Even Justice Roberts, in his scathing dissent in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, acknowledges so much, complaining that the Court had created 
“SCRAP [U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures] for a new generation,”191 which has become “emblematic 
not of the looseness of Article III standing requirements, but of how 
utterly manipulable they are if not taken seriously as a matter of 
                                                                                                                     
 186. For example, in class action lawsuits, plaintiffs “must allege and show that they 
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified 
members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975). 
 187. Justice Scalia is well known for his skepticism of environmental claims, denying 
standing to an environmental organization that had alleged actual injury to its members 
because the allegations were not geographically specific enough, Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and because the allegations did not include concrete, specific 
plans to study an endangered species that was jeopardized by a challenged governmental 
action, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 188. Mank, supra note 165, at 21-22 (citing, among others, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); United States 
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974)). 
 189. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (4th ed. 1999). 
 190. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure 
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 303 (1961). 
 191. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1471 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 
412 U.S. 669 (1973)). The SCRAP case is considered of questionable precedential value. See 
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 889 (“The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would 
suffice for § 702 review under its particular facts has never since been emulated by this 
Court, is of no relevance here . . . .”). 
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judicial self-restraint.”192 But if standing is just a rule of self-
restraint, how are courts to evaluate the tenuousness of claims for 
standing purposes, and decide when to exercise self-restraint?  
 To answer this question, it is useful to repeat a thought exercise 
posed earlier in this Article: what if we could actually name, see, and 
identify certain victims of pollution the way that we can identify 
victims of a plane crash? What if we knew, beforehand, the names of 
30,000 individuals that would die in the coming year from air 
pollution from power plants? What would we then demand of our 
judicial system in terms of seeking redress? Would we not be in an 
uproar if the judiciary simply demurred, “it’s not my job?” 
 Certainly, courts have not constricted standing in the way that 
Justice Scalia had hoped.193 Rather, subsequent cases show some 
openness in interpreting injury-in-fact.194 But courts have still been 
skeptical of injuries to unidentifiable individuals. As Professor Robin 
Kundis Craig has argued, courts have historically been unduly 
skeptical of environmental claims, ironically “dissociating” public 
health concerns with the concept of “injury.”195 Even when federal 
statutes have specified public health objectives and health-based 
standards,196 courts have often used the injury-in-fact inquiry to 
search for private injury, seemingly bypassing any thought of public 
injury.197 In so doing, one is tempted to conclude that some judges are 
really just skeptical of links between pollution and public health, or 
injury to anybody.198 If that is true, one wonders if a restrictive 
standings analysis is really about judicial modesty or judicial hubris. 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. 
 193. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-first Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 28 (2007) (“The retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor also opens up the 
possibility that the Court will revive Justice Scalia's long-standing campaign to restrict the 
standing of environmental plaintiffs . . . .”). 
 194. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 183-84 (2000) (“[T]he affiant members’ reasonable concerns about the effects of those 
discharges, directly affected those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic 
interests.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]e have no license to demean the importance of the interest that particular 
individuals may have in observing any species or its habitat, whether those individuals are 
motivated by esthetic enjoyment, an interest in professional research, or an economic 
interest in preservation of the species.”); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671-72 
(9th Cir. 1975); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615-
17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
 195. Craig, supra note 43, at 155. 
 196. Id. at 158-74. 
 197. Id. at 174-83. 
 198. Justice Scalia, who has campaigned vigorously for a restricted standing doctrine 
for environmental plaintiffs (and realized such in Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan and Lujan 
v. National Wildlife Federation), nevertheless found it obvious that the Endangered 
Species Act protected, within its zone of interests, the interests of regulated property 
owners to be free of “needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously 
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 176-77 (1997). In another Endangered Species Act case, Scalia bitterly dissented from 
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C.   Bias in Administrative Agencies – Regulatory Reform 
 Regulatory agencies, as extensions of the executive branch of 
government, are responsive to the same kinds of political pressures 
as the executive. As in the case of legislative and judicial 
identifiability biases, the less obvious and more troubling cases are 
those in which an identifiability bias is formalized or made routine in 
a way that permanently or systematically affects administrative 
decisionmaking. For administrative agencies, laws and regulations 
that institutionalize a preference for identifiable constituents are too 
common and too inconspicuous to sound warning bells.  
 As noted in Part IV.C. above, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
field officials have typically paid much more attention to identifiable 
constituents—their neighbors—than unidentifiable ones— 
environmentalists—even if the latter are given a voice by 
Washington D.C. lawmakers and bureaucrats. In fact, much of this 
preference for local interests is written into regulations. Regulations 
of grazing permits to private individuals utilizing federal public land 
emphasize the need to “consult, cooperate, and coordinate with” 
grazing permittees. BLM officials must “consult, cooperate, and 
coordinate with” affected permittees whenever the bureau issues or 
renews any lease,199 modifies the terms of any lease,200 adjusts 
grazing boundaries,201 and certainly when it plans to implement a 
reduction or a closure or partial closure of federally-leased 
rangeland.202 This rigid adherence to a process guaranteeing access 
to identifiable grazing permittees also guarantees that everyone else, 
                                                                                                                     
a majority ruling that certain land use prohibitions did not amount to a compensable 
“taking” under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, opining that “[t]he Court’s 
holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private 
lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon 
the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.” Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge David Sentelle of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit has similarly expressed disbelief that the ESA could possibly halt development 
activity, writing in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt that 
we may take it as a given that the statute forbidding the taking of 
endangered species can be used, provided it passes constitutional 
muster, to prevent counties and their citizens from building hospitals 
or from driving to those hospitals by routes in which the bugs 
smashed upon their windshields might turn out to include the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly or some other species of rare insect. That 
leaves the question for today as: by what constitutional justification 
does the federal government purport to regulate local activities that 
might disturb a local fly? 
 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 199. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(b) (2006). 
 200. Id. § 4130.3-3(a). 
 201. Id. § 4110.2-4. 
 202. Id. § 4110.3-3. Interestingly, until 2006, this latter regulation also required the 
consultation with “the interested public.” 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-3 (1995). 
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including the federal taxpayer, will be under-represented. Because 
this is such a formalized, routine process, the identifiability bias is 
more a matter of the structure of administrative decisionmaking 
than a random effect on a random decisionmaker. 
 Access, participation, and transparency have always been 
demanded from parties affected by administrative decisionmaking. 
From the earliest days of the administrative state, there has been 
steady pressure for reform, and it has typically taken the form of a 
call for greater transparency and accountability.203 The 
Administrative Procedure Act204 (APA), enacted in 1946, requires 
federal agencies to follow a set procedure for rulemaking that 
includes announcement of the proposed rulemaking,205 and an 
opportunity for public comment206 at least thirty days before a final 
rulemaking can be made and published.207 In 1990, Congress 
provided a means of further liberalizing the rulemaking process, 
passing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,208 which authorized 
agencies to include regulated parties in the very process of 
developing a rule, by creating “negotiated rulemaking committee[s]” 
that would include not only agency officials but “significantly 
affected” persons.209 The idea behind negotiated rulemaking was to 
make the administrative rulemaking process less adversarial, more 
cooperative, and more conducive to constructive information 
sharing,210 goals that seemed difficult to quibble with.211  
 Of course, negotiated rulemaking provides greater transparency, 
accountability, and greater representation—for identifiable parties. 
It is telling that the preamble states that “[n]egotiated rulemaking, 
in which the parties who will be significantly affected by a rule 
participate in the development of the rule, can provide significant 
advantages over adversarial rulemaking,” and that “[n]egotiated 
                                                                                                                     
 203. David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 7-19 (2005). 
 204. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006). 
 205. Id. § 553(b). 
 206. Id. § 553(c). 
 207. Id. § 553(d). 
 208. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (1990). 
 209. 5 U.S.C. § 565 (1990). 
 210. The preamble to the Act includes findings such as “[a]gencies currently use 
rulemaking procedures that may discourage the affected parties from meeting and 
communicating with each other, and may cause parties with different interests to assume 
conflicting and antagonistic positions and to engage in expensive and time-consuming 
litigation over agency rules,” and “[a]dversarial rulemaking deprives the affected parties 
and the public of the benefits of face-to-face negotiations and co-operation in developing 
and reaching agreement on a rule . . . [and] deprives them of the benefits of shared 
information, knowledge, expertise, and technical abilities possessed by the affected 
parties.” Pub. L. No. 101-648. §§ 2(2), 2(3).  
 211. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1353 (1997) 
(noting that virtually all of the academic literature was supportive of the Act). 
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rulemaking can increase the acceptability and improve the substance 
of rules, making it less likely that the affected parties will resist 
enforcement or challenge such rules in court.”212 The question raised 
by more skeptical scholars was, what about those not represented in 
the negotiated rulemaking committees?213 As William Funk has 
pointed out, it is odd that the Act contemplates participation in the 
negotiated rulemaking process by “parties,” but there is no mention 
of the public or its interest.214 Perhaps even more revealing, the Act 
requires that the “convenor”—the person charged with assembling a 
negotiated rulemaking committee—must ascertain the names of 
persons who are willing and qualified to represent interests that will 
be “significantly affected by [the] proposed rule, including residents 
of rural areas.”215 Just who did Congress have in mind when the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act was drafted? “Residents of rural areas” 
probably does not mean environmental organizations or public 
interest organizations. 
 Following on the heels of negotiated rulemaking, the Clinton 
administration, facing strong challenges from congressional 
Republicans who sought to curb environmental and ecological 
regulation, embarked upon a series of initiatives that it dubbed as 
“regulatory reinvention.”216 The specific reinvention initiatives also 
had catchy names, such as “Project XL,” “Habitat Conservation 
Planning,” and “Brownfields redevelopment,” and each created a 
somewhat formalized program of agency negotiation with regulated 
and potentially regulated parties.217 Project XL was an initiative that 
authorized the EPA to grant ad hoc waivers to regulated parties to 
undertake activities if the EPA believed that the ultimate result 
would be “superior environmental performance.”218 Habitat 
Conservation Planning authorized the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
to grant incidental take permits under the Endangered Species Act if 
a landowner facing ESA would agree to undertake super-
compensatory mitigation measures to improve endangered species 
                                                                                                                     
 212. Pub. L. No. 101-648 § 2(4-5) (emphases added). 
 213. Cf. Funk, supra note 211, at 1382-87 (“Thus, agencies are influenced to see their 
role not as serving the public interest, but as generating a consensus among the parties to 
the negotiation. Public choice theory is not resisted; it is adopted with a vengeance.” Id. at 
1386.); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at 
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1211 (1994). (“[R]egulatory negotiation is not 
democratically legitimate unless all interested parties are adequately represented. 
Agreement among only the subset of interests that have organized advocates is not 
sufficient.”).  
 214. Funk, supra note 211, at 1382-87. 
 215. 5 U.S.C. § 583(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 216. Hsu, supra note 84, at 33. 
 217. See infra notes 218-19. 
 218. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: XL Community Pilot Program, 60 
Fed. Reg. 55569-02 (Nov. 1, 1995).  
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habitat and if permitted actions will “not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of survival of the species in the wild.”219 The Brownfields 
Redevelopment program allowed the EPA to grant a landowner 
immunity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act220 (CERCLA) if she agreed to 
undertake some cleanup measures that might not otherwise be 
required or undertaken.  
 All of these reinvention measures, developed in a congressional 
climate that was decidedly hostile to government regulation and to 
the Democratic Clinton administration, were responses to pressures 
to make regulatory agencies more responsive and flexible.221 The 
result was a regime of negotiation with regulated parties. The effect, 
of course, was to formally and structurally grant access and a voice to 
regulated parties. Environmental organizations, to the extent that 
they represent the public interest of unidentifiable individuals, were 
generally not at the table. And while there is no empirical evidence 
that the regulatory bargains struck under reinvention programs 
were systematically disadvantageous to the public interest,222 one 
worries about the effect of having a whole system of essentially ex 
parte negotiations.223  
 Administrative agencies make mistakes. The identifiability bias is 
one class of errors that administrative agencies can make. 
Stakeholders to administrative decisions thus demand some 
transparency and even participation in order to protect themselves 
from administrative error. Given the vast amounts of information 
about any specific administrative dispute, it seems logical to open up 
administrative decisionmaking processes to stakeholders. But this is 
the crux of the structural identifiability bias. Just small amounts of 
information about only some stakeholders are enough to influence 
decisionmaking. In retrospect, it seems obvious: with increased 
transparency and participation comes influence. Unidentified 
individuals will never fully benefit from transparency or participate. 
                                                                                                                     
 219. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
 221. Hsu, supra note 84, at 34. 
 222. Id. at 38-42. 
 223. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 141-43 (1998). 
Before Regulatory Reinvention, there was Negotiated Rulemaking, the regulatory practice 
developed in the early 1990s to engage interested parties in a rulemaking before a rule is 
drafted up and published for public comment by the agency. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, 
Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 32, 32 (2000). With this earlier experience as well, public interest 
organizations were shut out and many worried that regulated agencies were being 
hoodwinked by regulated parties. Funk, supra note 211, at 1371-74 (1997); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 213, at 1210.  
478  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:433 
 
VI.   WHY DO STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES FORM? 
 An extended discussion of liberalism and its influence on Western 
democratic political systems is beyond the scope of this Article, but it 
is worth a brief digression to illustrate why identifiability biases run 
so deep and how systematic and unconscious this bias is against 
environmental protection.  
 Liberalism, in all its various forms,224 has one defining 
characteristic: a focus on the rights and autonomy of individuals.225 
Americans, having adopted a Lockean liberalism,226 with its 
particular concern with the protection of private property rights,227 
have taken up in earnest this emphasis on individual rights, casting 
                                                                                                                     
 224. A roster of “liberals” would include a very diverse list of political philosophers, 
political scientists, and legal scholars from Locke, who is most frequently associated with 
the ideal of private property rights protection, see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT ch. XI, § 138 (1690) (“[T]he supreme power cannot take from any man any 
part of his property without his own consent.”), to Rawls, best known for an unflagging 
concern for those least well off, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“All 
social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is 
to everyone’s advantage.”), and from Mill, a utilitarian, see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITIARIANISM 10 (Bobbs-Merrill 1957) (“The creed which accepts as the foundation of 
morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.”), to Dworkin, a critic of utilitarianism, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at vii (Harvard Univ. Press, 2001) (“This is the theory of utilitarianism, 
which holds that law and its institutions should serve the general welfare, and nothing 
else . . . . The critical portions of these essays criticize both parts of the theory . . . .”). 
Hence, as Rogers M. Smith has written, “[t]here was, of course, never any single, 
authoritative version of liberalism.” ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1985).  
 225. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 34 (1995) (“A liberal democracy’s most basic commitment is to the freedom and 
equality of its individual citizens. This is reflected in constitutional bills of rights, which 
guarantee basic civil and political rights to all individuals . . . .”); SMITH, supra note 224, at 
14 (“Liberalism’s most distinctive feature is thus its insistence that government should be 
limited so as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public pursuits of 
happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in practice.”). 
 226. Id. at 15 (“Locke is crucial . . . because the political philosophy of liberalism is 
historically linked with a whole range of distinctive developments that are best 
encompassed in his writings, such as parliamentary movements, new constitutional limits 
on government, economic mercantilism and nascent capitalism.”); id. at 16 (“[Locke] 
defines the principles liberals pursue; and Americans have always evaluated constitutional 
doctrines and devices largely in terms of their serviceability for liberal ends.”); LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991) 
(“Undoubtedly, one of the most influential thinkers for American statesmen of that era was 
the seventeenth-century English political philosopher John Locke.”). 
 227. LOCKE, supra, note 224, Ch. VII, § 87 (“Man being born . . . with a title to perfect 
freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of 
Nature, equally with any other man . . . hath by nature a power . . . to preserve his 
property - that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other 
men.”); Id. Ch. IX, § 124 (“The great and chief end, therefore, of mens uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property.”); TRIBE & DORF, supra note 226, at 71 (“In his Second Treatise on Government, 
Locke spelled out a natural rights theory of the origin of private property.”). 
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most constitutional questions as one of state versus individual.228 In 
privacy cases such as Olmstead v. United States,229 in which a liquor 
trafficker contested a wiretapping-aided conviction on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, one would expect a great judicial tussle over 
the scope of individual rights. In an enduring dissent, Justice 
Brandeis declared that the Constitution conferred on individuals, “as 
against the government, the right to be let alone . . . .”230 But even in 
seemingly purely economic cases such as Chicago, Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,231 a railroad rate regulation case, the 
Court took on a palpable individual rights focus, upholding plaintiffs’ 
complaint that unfavorable freight tariffs were “pro tanto a taking 
and depriv[ed] the company of its property without due process of 
law.”232 In McCulloch v. Maryland,233 the Court actually wondered if 
the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause234 authorized the 
federal government to establish a national bank of the U.S., even in 
the wake of a five-year period of brutal inflation and economic chaos. 
Private banks feared, and the Court feared for them, that the federal 
bank would simply be a profit-making corporation with a competitive 
advantage by virtue of being free from state taxation.235 Even the 
very nature of the U.S. Constitution—that of enumerated, not 
inherent, powers and authorizing the federal government to act only 
within the ambit of the enumerated powers236—is a basis for limiting 
federal governmental action. 
                                                                                                                     
 228. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1988) (“That all 
lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom 
is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism.”). The question of 
“regulatory takings” has clearly been couched in terms of the power of the state to take 
versus constitutional protections of private property. Constitutional law scholar Richard 
Epstein, in his book on regulatory takings of property, writes 
This book is an extended essay about the proper relationship between 
the individual and the state. . . . The question of governance is how the 
natural rights over labor and property can be preserved in form and 
enhanced in value by the exercise of political power, defined by Locke “to 
be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all 
less penalties, for regulating and preserving of property, and of 
employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws . . . .” 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3 
(1985). 
 229. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 230. Id. at 478. 
 231. 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
 232. Id. at 440-41. 
 233. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 234. “Congress shall have [the] Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 235. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 536-38 
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). 
 236. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118 (5th ed. 1995). 
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 In focusing upon the constant power struggle between individuals 
and states, however, this liberal perspective deflects attention from 
the beneficiaries of state action. State action is always undertaken 
with some public benefit in mind, even if public choice theorists 
would view it with skepticism. In fact, this skepticism, itself a 
product of a focus on individual rights, has been incorporated into 
institutions, practices, and doctrines in a way that guarantees a level 
of protection of property and economic rights. The protection of the 
right “to be let alone” has become such a basic instinct in public 
policy that it has structurally protected all manner of activities and 
land uses that produce environmental externalities. 
 Take for example the pervasive practice of grandfathering, which 
derives inspiration from Article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which 
provides that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”237 This prohibition on ex post facto regulation applies to 
criminal prosecutions, not environmental regulations,238 but the 
Constitutional enshrinement of such a prohibition is a strong signal 
to lawmakers that our system of government very reluctantly 
imposes hardships by virtue of changes in law. No grandfathering 
statute has specifically invoked Locke, but who can miss the obvious 
motivation of protecting property and economic rights, especially 
those activities that are economically productive in nature, those 
that “mix” labor with property?239  
 So, too, with regulatory reform, there is always an animating 
theme of protecting important property and economic rights from 
administrative action, a theme dating back to the Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota case.240 In a legal 
system in which administrative adjudications are becoming more and 
more important, liberal instincts ensure that individual rights are 
not trampled by arbitrary and capricious administrative action. So 
providing “accountability” from administrative agencies and greater 
“access” for regulated parties are goals that are clearly driven by 
liberal instincts to protect property and economic rights in the face of 
                                                                                                                     
 237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 238. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 299 (1866). 
 239. Locke famously theorized that ownership of property can come about by mixing 
one’s labor with property. LOCKE, supra note 224, § 20. Locke is most often and ardently 
invoked by civil libertarians advocating for smaller government, but there is literature 
suggesting that Locke himself might not have been as enthusiastically libertarian. Locke 
was more interested in an “ordered” liberty—meaning protection for the landed gentry, 
rather than for the masses, and Locke recognized the need for strong governmental 
authority to preserve that order. See, e.g., David DeGroot, The Liberal Tradition and the 
Constitution: Developing a Coherent Jurisprudence of Parental Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1287, 1296-99 (2000) (noting that Locke also wrote, in addition to his famous passages on 
individual rights, that “every particular man must part with his right to his liberty and 
entrust the magistrate with as full a power over all his actions as he himself hath”). 
 240. 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
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an ever-expanding administrative state. Even the notion of 
separating the central powers of federal government, inspired by 
Montesquieu,241 has as its goals the prevention of accumulation of 
federal power and the protection of individual rights.242 Hence, even 
the doctrine of standing, a key separator of powers in the federal 
government, can be traced to a liberal concern for individual rights. 
 Of course, liberals have a ready answer: an important part of the 
liberal state is the harm principle, which calls for governmental 
action to prevent harm to some individuals within the state.243 But 
“harm,” as Albert Lin has noted, is an extremely difficult notion to 
wrestle down when one speaks of environmental harms.244 Here is 
where liberals fail the environment: relying upon the amorphous 
harm principle as the sole justification for any infringement of 
individual rights creates an inherent inertia. In effect, environmental 
causes have been saddled with the burden of proof, and proof is often 
hard to come by in environmental cases. If the requirement is to 
produce a victim and a concrete harm, the environmental side is at a 
severe disadvantage because of the inherent difficulty of identifying 
victims. The less identifiable an individual is, the less concrete the 
harm.  
 If a legal system is established that presumptively honors the 
exercise of individual liberty and individual rights, but is willing to 
entertain grievances of harm imposed by one upon another, great 
importance is attached to the characterization of the harm. So what 
if, as in the case of many environmental harms, the harm is difficult 
to prove and difficult to attach to identifiable individuals? Herein lies 
the irony of the Dworkin class of liberals, who subscribe to Dworkin’s 
concept of rights as “trumps”245 in order to correct power imbalances. 
The irony is that those powerful and narrow interests that are the 
source of governmental failure have much more adroitly exploited 
the “rights” concept than have any public interest organizations, 
particularly environmental ones.  
                                                                                                                     
 241. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Franz Neumann ed., 
Thomas Hugent, trans., Hafner Press 1949) (“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary 
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might 
behave with violence and oppression.”). 
 242. TRIBE, supra note 228, at 2-3. 
 243. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 
1974) (1859) (“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”). 
 244. Lin, supra note 159, at 921. 
 245. Ronald Dworkin famously wrote that rights are “political trumps held by 
individuals.” DWORKIN, supra note 224, at xi. 
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VII.   COUNTERING THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS 
A.   The Occasional Environmental Bias 
 Those advocating on behalf of environmental causes have not 
missed out completely on the identifiability effect. Occasionally, an 
environmental catastrophe occurs that draws attention to a specific, 
identifiable group of persons. In such circumstances, sympathy for 
identifiable victims, and sometimes outrage at identifiable polluters, 
creates a groundswell for change and overwhelms any legislative or 
executive resistance. These are the occasional identifiability biases in 
favor of environmental protection. 
 In the mid-1970s, fifty-five-gallon drums of toxic waste began 
surfacing in the Niagara Falls community of Love Canal.246 Heavy 
rains had caused landfill caps to erode, and property that had been 
used as a toxic chemical disposal site spilled contaminants into an 
entire neighborhood.247 Within the course of a week in April of 1978, 
New York State Health Commissioner Robert Whalen declared the 
area a public health threat. By August, Whalen had ordered the 
evacuation of all women and children in the area; New York 
Governor Hugh Carey announced the state purchase of 238 homes in 
the area and the evacuation of all residents; and President Jimmy 
Carter dispatched federal funding to assist in the relocation and 
clean-up.248 Media attention was intense and no doubt drove 
legislative and executive impulses to act decisively. The result was 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)249 or “Superfund” law, which passed in the 
House of Representatives by a vote of 351 to 23 and was adopted by 
the Senate two months later, becoming law on December 11, 1980.250  
 It has been argued that the “availability heuristic”251 explains the 
unusual decisiveness on the part of state and federal lawmakers. 
This probably accounts for some of the momentum for legislation, but 
not all of it. Media frenzies never last more than a few weeks, but 
this account played out over the course of at least two years, 
culminating in the law’s passage in 1980. Identifiability provides a 
more enduring explanation for the continued interest in passing 
Superfund. The media frenzy died down, but the words “Love Canal” 
will forever conjure up a memory of what happened to a group of 
people. In addition to reducing the reference group size to that of a 
                                                                                                                     
 246. University at Buffalo Libraries, Love Canal @ 25 Exhibit, 
http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/asl/exhibits/lovecanal.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).    
 250.  See Library of Congress, THOMAS, H.R. 7020, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d096:HR07020:@@@X.  
 251. Jolls et al., supra note 32, at 1520-22, and accompanying text. 
2008]                          THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS 483 
 
community of several thousand residents, the Love Canal story was 
successful because most Americans could identify, and identify with, 
the middle-class residents of Love Canal. Because media attention 
was intense, images and footage of Love Canal residents and their 
travails became familiar fare to the American TV-viewing public. 
Even without environmental organizations driving a campaign, the 
identifiability effect attached itself to the Love Canal story and 
propelled it into history, as the genesis of one of the most important 
and copied environmental statutes.252 
 Other events have similarly seized public attention and locked 
focus onto a group of identifiable individuals in a way that has 
produced reform or legislation. In the wake of the horrendous 
tragedy in Bhopal, India, in which thousands of people were killed by 
an accidental release of methyl isocyanite,253 and in the wake of an 
eerily similar incident in West Virginia,254 Congress passed the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The act 
required firms with “extremely hazardous” substances to report their 
possession to the EPA and to local authorities and to coordinate with 
local authorities on emergency plans.255 In Canada, a scandalous 
cover-up of an E. coli bacteria problem by local water officials caused 
an outbreak in Walkerton, Ontario that killed seven people and 
sickened thousands, some permanently,256 and this also led to a 
number of regulatory and legislative changes throughout Canada.257 
From time to time, these events affecting a specific population serve 
as reminders of the human consequences of environmental 
malfeasance. 
 What about structural obstacles to remedying environmental 
harms? Can environmental plaintiffs overcome standing obstacles, 
for instance? Occasionally, environmentalists can find an identifiable 
                                                                                                                     
 252. CERCLA has been copied by jurisdictions throughout the world. A number of 
states have their own “Superfund statutes.” See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Back from the 
Margins: An Environmental Nuisance Paradigm for Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 395, 424 (2006). Most recently, the province of British Columbia passed 
the B.C. Environmental Management Act, which contains provisions that are, in many 
places, identical to the language of CERCLA. Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: 
Is What’s Past Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 
310 (2006). 
 253. Joseph J. Lisa, Negligence-Based Environmental Crimes: Failing to Exercise Due 
Care Can be Criminal, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 22 (2007). 
 254. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 156, at 483. 
 255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). 
 256. Canadian Man Jailed for Role in E. Coli Outbreak, EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, 
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-20/25115.html. 
 257. DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 18, 355 n.16 (2003) (noting the passage of the Ontario Safe Drinking Water 
Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 32 (Can.), the Quebec Drinking Water Regulation, R.R.Q. ch. Q-2, r. 4.1 
(2003), the Manitoba Drinking Water Safety Act, R.S.M., ch. 36, D-101 (2002) (Can.), and 
the Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002 S.S., ch. E-10.21 
(Can.)). 
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proxy for environmental harm, if there is a specific individual or 
group that can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. The Inuit 
people of Alaska and Northern Canada, whose way of life is highly 
dependent upon the integrity of the Arctic ecosystem, constitute a 
highly identifiable group of people.258 More importantly, however, 
they may be said to be suffering a “concrete and particularized” 
injury from global climate change.259 The National Snow and Ice Data 
Center in Boulder, Colorado recently reported that the average sea 
ice extent for September 2007 had shrunk to a shocking record low 
that was 23 percent lower than the previous record for the month of 
September, and that the Northwest Passage had opened for the first 
time in recorded history.260 The 4th IPCC Assessment, released in 
February 2007, made it quite clear that the shrinkage in Arctic sea 
ice is the result of human activity.261 While there remains substantial 
uncertainty about the specific effects of global climate change, almost 
every credible projection includes a prediction that the Arctic Ocean 
will become significantly warmer, floating sea ice will become much 
more rare—probably disappearing during summers—and the entire 
balance of life will be changed, with the result that the traditional 
Inuit life that includes whaling and hunting would likely be 
                                                                                                                     
 258. For Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) Chair and lead petitioner, Sheila Watt-
Cloutier, a petition and hearing is the latest of her attempts to leverage the identifiability 
of her people to gain support for action on climate change. Petition of Sheila Watt-Cloutier, 
Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from 
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United 
States (Watt-Cloutier v. U.S.) (Dec. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf [hereinafter ICC PETITION]. 
Long aware of the power of the identifiability of her people, she urged in a 2002 speech to 
the Harvard Club of Ottawa that “climate change is not to Inuit solely an environmental or 
even an[] economic issue, it is a matter of cultural health and survival. The media use 
images of disappearing ice and thinner and fewer polar bears to characterize climate 
change in the North. We need to give climate change a human face—an Inuit face.” Inuit 
Circumpolar Council Conference, Inuit in Global Issues, Speaking at the Harvard Club, 
Feb. 4, 2002, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=78&Lang=En.  
 259. See, e.g., Rachel D’oro, Coastal Alaskans Face Physical, Cultural Erosion, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2006, at A6 (describing how the Inuit people of the coastal town of Newtok 
have had to move for the second time in fifty years due to flooding and erosion, typical of 
many Alaskan native villages—184 out of 213— that have been trying to adjust to warmer 
temperatures, persistent flooding, and a dramatic shrinkage of sea ice and concomitantly 
shorter hunting seasons). 
 260. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Artic Sea Ice Shatters All 
Previous Record Lows (Oct. 1, 2007), http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/ 
20071001_pressrelease.html. 
 261. 4TH IPCC, supra note 68, at 10. The observed widespread warming of the 
atmosphere and ocean, together with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that it is 
extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past fifty years can be explained 
without external forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone. 
Id. The 8.1% and 23.2% figures are derived by multiplying the IPCC estimates of 2.7% of 
ice loss per decade by the three decades since 1978. Similarly, 23.2% is 7.4% times three. 
Id. at 8. 
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impossible.262 And that would in turn mean a breakup of the cultural 
customs that are predicated upon a cold, frozen, climate. 
 While the interests of the Inuit do not coincide perfectly with that 
of all humankind in reducing greenhouse gases, they overlap 
sufficiently for the Inuit to be an effective proxy. A lawsuit brought 
by Inuit peoples against those responsible for greenhouse gas 
emissions would serve the dual purposes of vindicating a variety of 
property rights of the Inuit263 and spurring the reduction of 
greenhouse gases, to the benefit of everyone.264 
B.   More Systematic Fixes for the Identifiability Bias 
 The diffuse nature of most environmental harms means that the 
pertinent reference group is large, and therefore not easily 
identifiable, at least not as identifiable as a group that might be 
harmed by regulation. If we are certain that this is true at least half 
the time, then there exists a bias against environmental regulation. 
Environmentalists will too often lose a people-based debate, more 
often than if lawmakers were given information about unidentifiable 
victims. 
 How, then, to counter the identifiability bias? This Article 
proposes three types of strategies for curbing identifiability biases, 
both incidental and structural. First, environmental lawmaking 
should generally be drafted liberally with “absolute” terms, or terms 
that provide environmental protection with a “trump.”265 Where there 
                                                                                                                     
 262. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
626 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing international consensus that greenhouse emissions were 
having a substantial effect on the environment). 
 263. See, e.g., Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, 2002 S.C., 
ch. 10 (Can.), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/LS/ 
371/c33-e.htm; Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, 1993 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.), available at 
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Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nunavut/pre_e.html. 
 264. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through 
the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). The Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an organization representing the Northern Aboriginal 
people of all Northern countries, has filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) in Washington, D.C., a human rights branch group of the 
Organization of American States. ICC PETITION, supra note 258. While the Commission 
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precedential value in a court of law, should lawsuit be brought. The IACHR initially 
rejected the petition when it was filed in December 2005, but announced that it would 
reconsider that decision, holding a hearing on March 1, 2007, to determine whether the 
impacts of climate change constitute a human rights violation within the meaning of its 
charter. See, e.g., Human Rights Body Reconsiders Inuit Climate Change Petition, CBC 
NEWS, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/02/06/climate-
hearing.html. 
 265. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410-11 (2005). 
486  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:433 
 
is a legal provision that has as its purpose the protection of some 
environmental good, discretion should be viewed as the enemy. 
Discretion in environmental disputes has more often than not 
resulted in some adjustment in favor of a regulated group.266 Second, 
where absolutes are not appropriate or possible for political reasons 
(and they will often not be), legislative and administrative action 
should be more frequently guided by cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis still contains many flaws and is still susceptible to 
manipulation. But it is less susceptible to manipulation than many 
alternative decisionmaking tools, and it is entirely possible that a 
good many of the flaws can be ameliorated with a set of “best 
practices” or standards by which to evaluate the cost-benefit 
analysis.267 Third, since environmental harm often affects large 
groups, environmental claims should be brought, when possible, by 
large groups. Whereas a small risk to an individual does not seem 
like “harm” in the sense that a court is likely to entertain, a 
substantial risk to members of a population is more likely to be 
considered “harm.” Class action lawsuits are one way of addressing 
diffuse environmental harms; a more general strategy of claim 
aggregation, with attendant legal theories to support such claims, is 
called for. 
1.   Curbing Discretion: The ESA 
 For all the trouble that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has 
been through, it is worth bearing in mind that in its application, it 
has actually been quite consistent in its primary goal of preserving 
biological diversity. Whatever one’s view on the ESA—and there are 
certainly detractors268—few would argue that courts and 
administrative agencies have been forced to pay some attention to 
biological diversity because of the ESA. Few would have predicted 
that the U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill269 
would rule against the Tennessee Valley Authority and rule in favor 
of protecting the habitat of the ugly, useless, three-inch-long snail 
darter. Plaintiff’s attorney and now Professor Zygmunt Plater, 
representing the snail darter and suing to stop completion of a dam 
that would have destroyed the habitat of the snail darter, found 
himself responding to a skeptical Justice Powell, who asked, “ ‘[w]hat 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Id. 
 267. See Daniel H. Cole, Towards ‘Best Practice’ Standards in Environmental Benefit-
Cost Analysis, at 3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
918834#PaperDownload. 
 268. See Dirk Kempthorne, Governor of Idaho, RX for the ESA: The Endangered 
Species Act at Thirty, in SPECIES PROTECTION AND THE LAW: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 
BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION, AND INVASIVE SPECIES CONTROL 223 (ALI-ABA Course of 
Study Apr. 6-8, 2005). 
 269. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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are these fish good for, anyway? Can you eat them? Are they good for 
bait?’ And isn’t that the question that everybody would want to ask? 
Why stop a humongous hydroelectric dam for a stupid little 
minnow?”270 As all environmental lawyers know, Plater was famously 
successful in winning the case, but not in convincing Justice Powell, 
who bitterly dissented, calling the cessation of construction of the 
dam an “ ‘absurd result’—in the words of the District Court of this 
case” and calling for the imposition of “common sense.”271 Chief 
Justice Burger’s majority opinion, however, is the one that has 
endured: 
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision 
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively 
command all federal agencies “to insure that actions 
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize 
the continued existence” of an endangered species . . . . This 
language admits of no exception. . . . Concededly, this view of 
the Act will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the 
anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of 
dollars in public funds. But examination of the language, 
history, and structure of the legislation under review here 
indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered 
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.272 
 Both Justice Powell’s dissent and Chief Justice Burger’s majority 
opinion contain important lessons for drafters of future 
environmental statutes. Justice Powell’s call for “common sense” is a 
cautionary flag: common sense is code for subconsciously yielding to 
some kind of identifiability bias.273 Common sense will invariably 
draw people to looking at the tangible human aspects of 
environmental decisionmaking, and for all the reasons set out in this 
Article, will slant the decisionmaking in favor of the more tangible 
humans.274  
                                                                                                                     
 270. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Mercer University College of Law Virtual Guest Speaker 
Program, Topic: The Snail Darter, The Tellico Dam, and Sustainable Democracy—Lessons 
for the Next President from a Classic Environmental Law Controversy (Feb. 12, 2002), 
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 271. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted). 
 273. Although the Court was interested in the costs of the dam, it is worth 
remembering that the costs are only meaningful because they signify some sort of tangible 
human suffering. The Tellico Dam was part of a regional economic development plan, one 
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Plater, supra note 270. 
 274. One wonders whether Justice Powell would have dissented as bitterly had the 
plaintiffs found a way to emphasize the plight of the 340 farmers who had land in the area 
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 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion provides guidance on how to 
counter the “common sense” identifiability bias. As Professor Plater 
emphasized, the mandatory nature of the ESA—the fact that the 
ESA provides that “[e]ach federal agency shall” ensure that its 
actions do not jeopardize endangered species275 has made all the 
difference. This is not to deny critics of the ESA that mandatory 
provisions of this nature sometimes create their own escape 
hatches;276 but no one can argue that the ESA, because of its 
mandatory, discretion-curbing provisions, has not served as a 
powerful impediment to the extinguishment of endangered species. 
 Mandatory or “absolute” provisions in legislation or regulations 
can cure some identifiability biases. The ESA prevented the U.S. 
Supreme Court from exercising a bias. Some biases, especially 
structural ones, can be cured; a regulatory takings case—with a 
constitutional question—would obviously trump even a statute with 
mandatory provisions. But if public lands grazing reform were ever 
to take place, surely some of the vast discretion that has been 
conferred upon local BLM officials would be best replaced with 
absolute provisions. For those cases in which the political stars are 
aligned and there exists a mandate for true environmental reform, 
the use of absolute provisions as environmental “trumps”277 would 
have to be an important way of curbing the identifiability bias. 
Particularly when there are irreversible environmental effects 
involved—such as species extinction—some absolutism seems to be a 
properly draconian form of environmental regulation. And even if 
regulatory reform continues to soak into administrative 
decisionmaking, it would certainly be possible to include some 
absolute provisions into the rulemaking and regulatory negotiation 
rules that protect environmental interests. 
2.   Curbing Discretion: NEPA 
 Another beacon for environmentalists is the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),278 one of the most copied statutes 
in the world.279 One of the few parsimonious U.S. environmental 
                                                                                                                     
the formal eminent domain proceedings, however, the farmers had no real legal basis on 
which to object. Id.  
 275. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added); Plater, supra note 270 (“Tell me 
about the word ‘shall.’ If it were ‘may,’ nothing would have happened.”). 
 276. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living 
Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 
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 277. See Sinden, supra note 265, at 1484. 
 278. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
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some form of NEPA. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 156, at 783. 
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statutes, NEPA simply requires that federal agencies undertaking 
federal actions (that would include permitting private parties to 
undertake activities that fall under the jurisdiction of the agency) 
conduct an assessment of the environmental impacts of the 
activity.280 NEPA imposes no substantive obligations on an agency,281 
and NEPA does not require that an agency “elevate environmental 
concerns over other appropriate considerations.”282 Agencies enjoy a 
fairly lenient “arbitrary, [or] capricious” standard of review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.283 But NEPA has bared its procedural 
teeth often in its thirty-five year history, requiring agencies to go 
back and repeat sloppily-done review processes and requiring 
agencies to take into account information that it had failed to 
consider the first time around.284 NEPA has even forced a federal 
agency to backpedal on commitments made to a highly identifiable 
aboriginal group on whaling rights because the agency did not 
engage in an environmental review before making the 
commitment.285  
 Like the ESA, NEPA has its own landmark improbable victories. 
For NEPA, the case Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission286 was a watershed event. The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals required the Atomic Energy Commission to 
not only perform an environmental impact statement pursuant to 
NEPA, but also to take it into account in its decision as to whether to 
license a nuclear power plant.287 To lawyers unfamiliar with 
administrative law or environmental law, the holding seems 
absurd—forcing the Atomic Energy Agency to look at and consider its 
own reports seems like a surreal victory. Yet, forcing a very powerful 
agency to go back and redo a lengthy decision process under NEPA 
should not be trivialized. Although NEPA is “stunningly simple”—
forcing agencies to stop, consider, and disclose the environmental 
                                                                                                                     
 280. National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). 
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558 (1978). 
 282. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). 
 283. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 284. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring the 
consideration of environmental impacts of connected or related federal permitting 
activities); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(requiring consideration of information that was submitted by another federal agency and 
rejecting an agency’s reliance on information that was known to be inaccurate); Calvert 
Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (requiring the Atomic Energy Commission to actually consider a report on the 
impacts of nuclear energy, rather than simply insert it in the administrative record). 
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 287. Id. at 1128-29. 
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impacts of a project288—the legislation has played an important role 
in a number of major environmental cases.289 Because it has achieved 
so much with so few words, it is hard not to admire NEPA’s 
“genius.”290 
 By contrast, the Canadian experience with environmental 
assessment provides an unfortunate example of what happens when 
permitting agencies are vested with wide discretion with respect to 
environmental impact assessments. While much of the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)291 mimics NEPA, the 
inconsistency in judicial applications robs the CEAA of its 
effectiveness292 and certainly prevents it from acting as a bulwark 
against identifiability bias.  
 In Friends of the West Country Ass’n v. Canada,293 a Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal294 held that the permitting agency had the 
authority to determine the scope of a project for environmental 
assessment purposes. The issue comes up in environmental 
assessment cases in which a project proponent and a permitting 
agency segment a project into different phases, aspects, or 
components so as to make the environmental impacts seem small, 
even if the cumulative impacts of the whole project are large. The 
Federal Court of Appeal held, however, in an opinion by now 
Supreme Court Justice Marshall Rothstein, that the permitting 
agency responsible for the environmental assessment has wide 
discretion to determine the scope of the project.295 This was an 
incredible act of deference to the Canadian Coast Guard, which had 
permitted the construction of two bridges without requiring it to 
consider the cumulative effects of the bridges and the effects of the 
logging road that necessitated the bridges or the logging operations 
that would make use of the road and bridges.296 The environmental 
assessments for both of the bridges simply stated that the scope of 
the environmental assessment included the “site and downstream of 
                                                                                                                     
 288. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (2002). 
 289. See, e.g., notes 269-72, 282-84 and accompanying text. 
 290. Karkkainen, supra note 288, at 904. William Rodgers describes NEPA as “[t]he 
most admired of all the environmental laws . . . . It is admired for its form, its structure, 
and its robustness. It is praised for its eloquence of formulation and for the cleverness in 
the way it was attached to existing agency mandates.” William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most 
Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: The “Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 31. 
 291. 1992 S.C., ch. 37 (Can.). 
 292. See generally Andrew Green, Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 785 (2002) (describing the vagueness of 
the CEAA and the Federal courts’ lack of improvement of the situation). 
 293. [1998] 4 F.C. 340. 
 294. The Canadian equivalent of the U.S. federal court of appeals. 
 295. Friends of the West Country, [1998] 4 F.C. 340 at paras. 12-28. 
 296. Id. at paras. 2-5, 12. 
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the bridge” and that the agency did not consider there to be any 
cumulative effects, since the bridge would be “isolated from other 
man-made structures by several kilometers.”297 No mention in either 
assessment was made of the other bridge, or of the logging road or 
subsequent logging operations.298 This case is on all fours with the 
U.S. case Thomas v. Peterson,299 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals invalidated an environmental assessment under NEPA that 
considered the construction of a logging road in isolation of the 
logging plan that had already been developed for the area. The 
difference? The CEAA does not have, as NEPA does, binding 
regulations on project scoping that mandates the inclusion of related 
projects in an environmental assessment. Canadian courts have 
given agencies wide latitude in determining what projects should be 
included in scoping and environmental assessment.300  
 While NEPA can certainly be improved,301 it has been surprisingly 
successful in compelling agencies to confront and consider 
environmental effects that might otherwise be overlooked, even if no 
substantive result is required. NEPA may not have been drafted with 
unidentifiable individuals in mind, but it has been a great equalizer 
in forcing agencies to consider the interests of those less obviously 
affected by projects sponsored or permitted by federal agencies. And 
the procedural-only mandates of NEPA only underscore the main 
thesis of this Article—that what is most lacking is a sustained 
attention on those indirectly, remotely, or less obviously affected by 
projects having an impact on the environment.  
3.   Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Curing structural identifiability biases requires structural reform, 
which, given the deep liberal roots of Western political and legal 
institutions, may be difficult. However, there is one structural reform 
that seems to have gained at least a toehold in the public 
policymaking realm: cost-benefit analysis. Although cost-benefit 
analysis is caricatured by some as a stratagem for deregulation,302 
                                                                                                                     
 297. Id. at para. 31.  
 298. Id.  
 299. 753 F.2d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 300. In Friends of the West Country, Justice Rothstein did, however, rule that the 
Canadian Coast Guard abused its discretion in failing to take into account the cumulative 
impacts of the other projects, even if they were not included in the scope of the review. 
[1998] 4 F.C. 340 at paras. 30-40. 
 301. Brad Karkkainen has remarked that the NEPA process has often been “paper-rich 
but information-poor,” noting that the procedural requirements have forced agencies to 
produce documentation of their environmental considerations, rather than carefully taking 
account of the environmental considerations themselves. Karkkainen, supra note 288, at 
909-37. 
 302. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 41-60 (2004). Ralph Nader, in a tribute to the 
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the use of cost-benefit analysis enjoys fairly bipartisan political 
acceptance, with President Clinton’s adoption of the practice through 
Executive Order 12866.303 President Clinton’s version of cost-benefit 
analysis was considerably more flexible than President Reagan’s 
original Executive Order 12291, which provided that for “major” 
regulatory actions (defined as having an economic impact of $100 
million or more),304 “[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken 
unless the potential benefits . . . outweigh the potential costs . . . .”305 
By contrast, President Clinton’s executive order required agencies to 
assess costs and benefits and would only propose or adopt a 
regulation “upon a reasoned determination that the benefits . . . 
justify its costs.”306 President Clinton’s executive order thus mandates 
cost-benefit analysis, but only as a piece of important information, 
not a decision rule. A 2000 rulemaking for establishing a new arsenic 
standard for drinking water involved an extensive cost-benefit 
analysis; in the end, the EPA chose a level at which the costs of 
compliance slightly exceeded the benefits.307 EPA took the position 
that because of the exclusion of some nonquantifiable benefits, and 
given considerable uncertainties in the analysis, the benefits justified 
the costs, even if they did not exceed them.308 Given the continued 
uncertainties with respect to cost-benefit analysis—as the arsenic 
rulemaking demonstrates—this approach of being a “tool, not a rule,” 
seems appropriate. 
 There continues to be substantial concern, led by academics, over 
the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law. Criticism takes 
one of two forms: (i) pointing out methodological flaws that render 
cost-benefit analysis unreliable,309 and (ii) categorical rejection, on 
mostly deontological grounds, of cost-benefit analysis as a policy-
making tool.310 The latter form of objection seems unhelpful, 
                                                                                                                     
book, wrote “Priceless takes apart the barren but intricate hokum of deregulatory 
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 303. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 304. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 § 1(a)(3)(b)(1) (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 305. Id. § (a)(3)(e)(b) (emphasis added). 
 306. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
 307. Environmental Protection Agency, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 
66 Fed. Reg. 6976-01, 7022 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 141 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
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 309. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. 
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REV. 7 (1998); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003). 
 310. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 35-40; MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY 
OF THE EARTH 8-9 (1988). 
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especially when it involves one or two stories of cost-benefit analysis 
gone bad, followed by an extrapolation to all that is wrong with 
economics in environmental law.311 A more nuanced critique of cost-
benefit analysis takes a meta-view of cost-benefit analysis and 
observes two things: (i) current U.S. environmental law, mostly 
legislated in the 1970s, was not driven by cost-benefit analysis; and 
(ii) in the current period of environmental inaction,312 cost-benefit 
analysis currently seems to be doing more to hinder environmental 
regulation than advance it.313 Hence, this critique goes, advocates of 
cost-benefit analysis really haven’t made the case that cost-benefit 
analysis can enhance environmental protection rather than, as critics 
charge, hinder it. 
 This meta-view critique is true as far as it goes, but ignores all 
else that could account for the current period of congressional and 
executive inaction. The fundamental problem with environmental 
law is that since the 1970s, public opinion on environmental law has 
become more nuanced and complex over time. A much ballyhooed 
2004 essay, The Death of Environmentalism, argued that the failure 
of the environmental movement and of environmental organizations 
has been that they have ignored the changing view of 
environmentalism in an American household concerned with a 
variety of issues, many of which are economic.314 This is bad news for 
academic environmentalists, as it demeans the importance of their 
profession, although the grand importance of global climate change 
may pull environmentalism back onto the front burner. But even if 
environmentalism gets a shot in the arm from the increasing 
                                                                                                                     
 311. Ackerman and Heinzerling actually make great hay from the fact that Italian 
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awareness of global climate change, those arguing for greater 
environmental protection will still have to answer the question of 
how much, and how. That there is much low-hanging fruit to be 
currently picked to arrest climate change dodges that question.315 
 No critic of cost-benefit analysis has truly grappled with the 
relation of environmentalism to the overall ordering of society. 
Virtually all environmental critics of cost-benefit analysis take as 
their starting point the unquestioned need for more environmental 
protection, without examining why. This Author agrees with that 
assessment, but gaining more popular acceptance of why we protect 
the environment is not a step that can be skipped over. This Article 
argues that one way to remind ourselves of the importance of 
protecting the environment is to remind ourselves of the 
unidentifiable beneficiaries of environmental law. In moving forward 
in a world that is concerned with the environment, but also economic 
concerns, cost-benefit analysis is one of the few ways of accounting 
for unidentifiable individuals. 
 The identifiability bias suggests that there must be some way of 
placing the unidentifiable victims of environmental harm on an equal 
footing with the identifiable economic victims of environmental 
regulation. To do this, there must be a common metric. One possible 
metric could be a measure of the total lives saved, but this has two 
problems. First, a lives-saved metric would ignore the many illnesses 
and non-fatal health problems caused by pollution. Failure to 
account for them would raise a bias itself. Second, a lives-saved 
metric would require an estimate of how many lives are saved by not 
spending money on environmental protection and instead investing 
money in economic growth. That economic growth produces more 
health is, at least in commonly accepted measures, beyond dispute. 
But exactly how much wealth produces an extra human life is a 
thorny question, one that as yet lacks the empirical support of the 
flipside question of how much a human life is “worth.”316 Another 
possibility would be to include not just lives saved, but a whole menu 
of health benefits of pollution prevention.317 However, this is just like 
cost-benefit analysis, except without the final step—some way of 
                                                                                                                     
 315. See, STERN REVIEW, supra note 72 (noting that actions amounting to about 1% of 
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grappling with the comparability of lives saved with other health 
outcomes.318 
 When considered in this light, the idea of monetization becomes 
more palatable, if only because it can be used to measure the effects 
of so many kinds of environmental harm. Attempts to monetize some 
environmental harms are controversially inaccurate, but stopping 
there would beg the all-important question: how do we weigh the 
importance of the environmental benefits against the economic costs 
of regulation? The alternatives that have been suggested by 
environmental advocates and legal scholars thus far have their own 
problems, an extensive discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Suffice it to say, however, that these alternative paradigms 
do not address the identifiability bias. Cost-benefit analysis 
addresses the identifiability bias because the measure of human 
sacrifice is not identifiability-dependent. The loss of human life and 
the illness caused by pollution is accounted for and balanced against 
the economic value of the pollution-producing activity. That we make 
this balancing is indisputable, as we very consciously undertake risk, 
as individuals and as a society. The goal of cost-benefit analysis 
ought to be to emulate how we undertake risks and reproduce it in 
environmental policy.  
 Since there is already a fair bit of current practice, and with a 
great deal of emphasis being placed on cost-benefit analysis under 
the Bush Administration,319 how might cost-benefit analysis be 
changed to be more of an aide to environmental protection? First, 
critics are correct in that a great deal of variation does exist in cost-
benefit practices,320 lending misplaced credence to the claim that it is 
“hopelessly indeterminate.”321 A helpful way forward would be, as 
Professor Daniel Cole has suggested, convening a National Academy 
                                                                                                                     
 318. Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that in evaluating a variety of risks to human 
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496  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:433 
 
of Sciences panel to develop a set of “best practices” of cost-benefit 
analysis, against which agencies’ cost-benefit analyses might be 
judged for their veracity and usefulness.322 All but the most vehement 
critics of cost-benefit analysis concede that if done properly, it can 
serve as an important piece of information. What has been sorely 
lacking is some credible account of what it means to do a cost-benefit 
analysis “properly.” The best chance at settling most of a bitter and 
sometimes personal debate323 is to call on a body such as the National 
Academy of Sciences, which still carries considerable weight and 
good repute. A set of standards would also help avoid the time-
consuming turf wars between the Office of Management and Budget 
and the separate regulatory agencies, most notably EPA,324 and 
conduct a searching inquiry of a number of issues in need of 
resolution, including the appropriate social discount rate, if any.325 
 Second, few mechanisms currently exist in which a cost-benefit 
analysis is compelled in order to consider a regulation that was not 
yet in the making; the executive orders merely call for cost-benefit 
analysis when a regulation is proposed. The Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget 
                                                                                                                     
 322. Cole, supra note 267, at 3. 
 323. The following excerpts are illustrative of the sometimes personal nature of the 
debate: 
It is not hard to discover who started the myths of absurdly expensive 
regulations. Follow the footnotes back to the original sources, and again 
and again they lead to the same few, repeatedly cited studies, by John 
Morrall, John Graham, Tammy Tengs, Ralph Keeney, W. Kip Viscusi, and 
Randall Lutter. The tales of ‘killer regulations’ are based on just a handful 
of authors, and on an even smaller handful of hard facts. 
Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Comment, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory 
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 649 (2002). 
Richard Belzer, Robert Crandall, John Graham, Wendy Gramm, Robert 
Hahn, Thomas Hopkins, Robert Litan, Randall Lutter, John Morrall, and 
W. Kip Viscusi are not exactly household names. But they have had an 
influence on attitudes towards protective regulation that is out of all 
proportion to their name recognition and their size as a group. These 
analysis and their institutional homes . . . are responsible for generating 
the critical pieces of ‘antiregulatory’ data and analysis, upon which the 
second Bush administration bases its ardently pro-industry stance. 
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 41. 
Any close observer of the regulatory process has learned by now that the 
government often requires the expenditure of a huge sum of money— 
sometimes billions of dollars—to save a single human life. She has also 
learned that there are many regulatory options available that would 
produce the same benefits at a far lower cost. She has learned these things 
largely from a table prepared during the 1980s by an economist at the 
Office of Management and Budget named John Morrall. 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, supra note 309, at 1983. 
 324. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 267, at 8-20; Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies With 
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(2001).  
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(OMB) can send a “prompt letter” to federal agencies “to suggest an 
issue that OMB believes is worthy of agency priority.”326 In other 
words, this is a way that OMB can tell agencies about a problem 
worthy of regulation. It would be unfair to say that OMB has idled 
this mechanism, having issued thirteen prompt letters since 2001, 
when the prompt letter was created. Prompt letters have called for 
regulation requiring the labeling of foods containing transfatty 
acids,327 the maintenance by certain employers of automatic external 
defibrillators,328 greater disclosure for federal housing lenders Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac,329 better disclosure of data under the EPA’s 
toxic release inventory,330 and, if one were generous, a prompt letter 
was one of many forces pushing EPA to develop a rule regarding 
particulate matter pollution.331 However, in the hands of an agency 
that has as its primary mission the questioning of regulation,332 this 
does not seem quite enough.  
 In addition to endorsing Professor Cole’s proposal, this Article 
immodestly proposes a new mechanism: the citizen prompt letter. 
Like citizen suits, the citizen prompt letter is intended to provide a 
voice to otherwise under-represented interests. However, something 
more must be required than the simple, three-page requests that the 
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OIRA director can issue,333 otherwise it would be simple to flood an 
agency with spurious requests. I thus propose that unlike the current 
prompt letter process, a citizen prompt letter must be supported by a 
cost-benefit analysis, demonstrating that the benefits of a proposed 
regulation would exceed the costs. Agencies would be required within 
some period of time to respond to requests by any person calling for 
study of a regulation, if the request is supported by a credible cost-
benefit analysis that the costs of regulation would be outweighed by 
the benefits. What would “credible” mean? That is something that 
the future National Academy of Sciences panel would help 
determine. For those that would worry that such a mechanism would 
produce a flurry of frivolous requests, the mere trouble of compiling a 
cost-benefit analysis would surely discourage the gadfly 
environmentalist from flooding agencies with regulation requests. 
Second, with a set of National Academy of Sciences best practices 
standards in place, it would be an easier administrative matter to 
summarily dismiss those requests and cost-benefit analyses that do 
not pass muster.  
 As in the case of prompt letters, an agency response could be of 
the nature of “you’re right, we’re working on it.”334 In the case of a 
request not supported by a cost-benefit analysis or attached to a cost-
benefit analysis that does not meet standards set out by the National 
Academy of Sciences panel, an agency response could simply be of 
the nature “go away, your request does not meet the standards 
required of [the code provisions governing submission of citizen 
prompt letters].” While it is true that this process will certainly 
generate disputes over what cost-benefit analyses pass muster and 
which do not, and while it is true that some agencies will, out of 
sheer laziness, issue some “go away” letters even where regulation is 
warranted, our lessons from NEPA indicate that the mere existence 
of this process is important. Agencies often respond perfunctorily to 
comments about rulemaking, but that does not diminish the 
importance of the process of notice and comment itself. The fact that 
regulated industries spend millions of dollars in legal fees submitting 
comments through their lawyers, or that environmental 
organizations spend an enormous amount of energy submitting 
comments, is evidence of the innate importance of the notice and 
comment process. For cost-benefit critics who find fault with the 
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transparency of cost-benefit analysis,335 a citizen prompt letter 
process could not make the situation worse, and could well make it 
better. Any response from an agency other than “go away” would 
reveal some information about the assumptions of the agency in 
balancing costs and benefits. 
 This proposal must certainly bring more information into 
administrative agencies. The question might then be, would this 
process bring too much information into an agency? Would citizen 
prompt letters provide information that would skew an agency’s view 
of a problem? In particular, does a citizen prompt letter proposal 
heighten the danger of rent-seeking through regulation? 
 George Stigler’s The Theory of Economic Regulation,336 the 
inspiration for much public choice theory and the intellectual grist 
for much of what became the deregulation movement, might suggest 
that if citizen prompt letters lead to more regulation, overall 
economic efficiency might be ill-served. Stigler’s focus was more on 
economic regulation, where the state’s power to coerce may be used 
to restrict entry into markets and protect incumbents.337 This danger 
is not trivial with respect to environmental regulation. Most 
environmental lawyers are familiar with Ackerman and Hassler’s 
Clean Coal/Dirty Air, in which the authors explain the imposition of 
scrubber technology on coal-fired power plants as a way of preserving 
mining jobs, because mandating scrubber technology preserved the 
usefulness of the dirty, high-sulfur coal mined in the Appalachians.338 
The victims of such rent-seeking are those that may have benefited 
from market entry or who may have prospered by an electricity 
industry much less dependent upon coal—ironically, unidentifiable 
victims. But Stigler’s concern with rent-seeking is considerably more 
troubling in the area of economic regulation than in environmental 
regulation.  
 For this reason, and because this Article only seeks to correct 
biases in environmental law, I propose, as an experimental first step, 
that only the EPA be made to respond to citizen prompt letters. 
Doubtless, there are many other agencies that issue environmental 
regulations from time to time, and virtually all federal agencies carry 
out activities that have some environmental impacts. But as this 
might be considered by some to be a fairly radical proposal, it seems 
prudent to focus initial efforts on studying this process on only one 
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agency, and on the one that makes a controversial use of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 This Author has written elsewhere on the problems of command-
and-control environmental regulation, on the preferability of a 
taxation scheme or a tradeable permit scheme,339 but the rent-
seeking possibilities in environmental abatement, of the sort 
chronicled by Ackerman and Hassler, seem less dangerous. For one 
thing, a cost-benefit analysis would, in this author’s opinion, reveal 
the economic and environmental superiority of a taxation scheme or 
a tradeable permits scheme. Second, there may be environmental 
engineering firms that wish to mandate installation of their 
particular abatement technology, but there will also be firms that 
would be required to pay for that technology, that would resist 
regulation. The history of environmental law is not dotted with 
instances of over-regulation.340 
 This proposal would supplant none of the existing executive 
orders, rules, regulations, and administrative law that speak to 
rulemaking, administrative procedure, or cost-benefit analysis. 
Promulgating a new rule would still require a “reasoned 
determination that the benefits justify its costs.”341 All of 
administrative law, including notice and comment provisions, 
remain. All that this proposal adds is the ability for citizens and 
citizen groups to participate in the cost-benefit analysis and to use 
cost-benefit analysis in a way that may advance regulation, not just 
question it.  
 Would Congress go for such a proposal? It is certainly possible, of 
course, and perhaps even probable, that such a program would 
increase the strain on agency resources. But in a time in which 
neither environmentalists nor regulated industry groups are happy 
with the job that federal agencies are doing, does it not make sense 
to open up agencies to more citizen input? Every administrative law 
scholar has either argued or acknowledged that agencies have 
trouble collecting pertinent information on regulation; this proposal 
would simply force agencies to consider the cost-benefit information 
that is thrust before them. Of course, filtering out the useless, non-
credible information is time-consuming, but the value of incoming 
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information must surely outweigh the administrative hassle of 
sifting. Throw in an apparent increase in congressional interest in 
the concept of cost-benefit analysis,342 and this proposal may actually 
be a political winner. 
 The political winds have changed, subtly enough that most 
Washington, D.C. environmentalists and academic environmentalists 
have failed to notice that while the median voter remains concerned 
about the environment, she is also concerned with economic well-
being, especially in a globalized world of brutal economic 
competition. Despite this, most important new initiatives aimed at 
strengthening environmental protection would probably justify 
themselves quite easily, if only the effort were made to compare the 
benefits with the costs. With some adjustments and some enhanced 
credibility lent by National Academy of Sciences intervention, cost-
benefit analysis may serve an important role in garnering some 
representation of the interests of unidentifiable individuals.  
4.   Claim Aggregation 
 The nature of environmental and ecological harms is, at least for 
most ex ante wrongs, probabilistic. For example, the environmental 
wrong that is perpetrated by a polluter upon some downwind 
population is an increase in risk of some disease caused by the 
pollution. From an individual perspective, such inchoate harm is 
generally not actionable under traditional tort principles.343 In Metro-
North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,344 the Supreme Court 
rejected a claim for risk damages by a pipefitter that had been 
negligently and repeatedly exposed to asbestos dust by his employer. 
Writing for a seven-member majority, Justice Breyer ruled that 
absent any physical symptoms of asbestos-related illness, the 
exposure did not amount to an actionable “physical impact” that 
would support a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress.345 
Importantly, Justice Breyer seemed particularly concerned with the 
potential that an award of damages in a case like this would open the 
floodgates to more claims, many of which would be fraudulent.346 In 
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other words, Justice Breyer feared, as does traditional tort law, that 
harmed plaintiffs may simply be too hard to identify in order to 
justify recovery. 
 Given the difficulty facing individual plaintiffs exposed to 
potential harm, or an increased risk of harm347 (which describes many 
environmental wrongs), persons exposed to large-scale 
environmental risks would be well-advised to aggregate large-scale 
risk-based claims,348 through, among other mechanisms, class action 
lawsuits. The lack of individualized adjudication that has civil 
proceduralists wringing their hands349 is a small price to pay if the 
alternative is no legal recognition at all of any claim.350 Individuals 
have had difficulty establishing a harm from risk on an individual 
level, but risks imposed upon a population actually result in harm to 
a statistically identifiable number of individuals within the 
population, translating a mere risk of harm into an actual harm, 
albeit not suffered by every individual within that population. 
Whereas individual plaintiffs such as Buckley, having only a risk to 
show as harm and having a hard time meeting the threshold of proof, 
a group of individuals may be able to meet the burden as a group, 
because they can show with statistical certainty that some of which 
will suffer harm. Moreover, a collectivized claim for the imposition of 
a risk, if successful, serves deterrence and compensation policies of 
tort law.351 
 An aggregation of claims for environmental wrongs in the form of 
heightened risk exposure helps solve the identifiability problem not 
only because the evidentiary task is less onerous than it would be for 
individualized claims, but also because it creates a reference group 
that is smaller and thus more identifiable than that of simply society 
at large. An aggregation of plaintiffs creates a reference group that 
can be thought of as having suffered a group wrong—a downwind 
community that now faces higher rates of lung cancer, or a 
community with a toxic waste problem and a higher incidence of 
childhood leukemia. This is heuristically much easier to envision and 
identify, and therefore stands a better chance of overcoming the kind 
of legislative and judicial resistance that has plagued environmental 
advocacy in the past. While not every environmental wrong will take 
on the status of a Love Canal or a Woburn or a Bhopal, the creation 
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of a discrete reference group will at least counterbalance the 
identifiability bias, while the aggregation of wrongs serves to create a 
legally cognizable harm.  
 Environmental advocates can learn from lawyers representing 
mass claimants in other substantive areas. Securities fraud and 
antitrust violations share much in common with environmental 
wrongs. All three types of wrongs involve harms that might be small 
when viewed from an individual perspective, but since they may 
involve many individuals, can be quite large in the aggregate. All 
three typically involve many unidentifiable victims. All three involve 
collective action problems in terms of the low incentives of 
individuals to bring claims,352 and all three have made use of class 
action lawsuits.353 However, only securities cases and antitrust cases 
have a solid body of case and statutory law on measuring damages. 
For securities law, the “fraud on the market” theory354 has become 
well-settled law, as have other price-based theories,355 and consumer 
welfare damage theories have become a part of antitrust law,356 along 
with the statutory treble damages.357 However, no theory of 
environmental or natural resource damages has taken root in such a 
way as to provide a default method of ascertaining environmental or 
natural resource damages. As noted in the discussion above on cost-
benefit analysis, environmentalists have generally resisted 
monetizations of environmental and natural resource goods and 
outcomes.358 This is not helpful from the standpoint of recovery for 
environmental wrongs. As many detractors of environmental 
regulation have learned, invoking cost figures does not necessarily 
cheapen the human hardships (real or not) of environmental 
regulation and does not necessarily reduce their identifiability. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 Because humans have natural propensities to identify with other 
humans and to sympathize with other humans that are known to 
them, overcoming an identifiability bias in lawmaking is a difficult 
task. Lawmaking should obviously reflect human values and, to some 
extent, human propensities. Sympathy is not something that should 
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be expunged from lawmaking processes. But sympathy is also not a 
human propensity that should be driving policy, least of all 
environmental policy. Our sympathy for identifiable individuals 
must be bounded by a realization that others, not necessarily known 
to us, die and suffer. Just recognizing that we will naturally harbor 
an identifiability bias would be progress in itself. Structural reforms 
might be considered that would build in considerations other than 
the immediate and visceral effects on identifiable individuals, 
communities, and groups. In addition, maintaining the existing 
safeguards, such as the Endangered Species Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act, will be vital.  
 Substantively debiasing environmental policy to compensate for 
identifiability bias is a taller order. This would require that we 
grapple with the question of how we compare the harm done to 
identifiable victims with unidentifiable ones. In the regulatory arena, 
this is the business of cost-benefit analysis, which is clearly 
unfinished. In other arenas, it requires the evaluation of delicate 
ethical tradeoffs, the making of which is clearly a large job before us. 
 In some ways, the identifiability bias should be obvious to those 
involved in making environmental law and policy. The very reason 
that we need environmental law is to protect those things that we 
might not otherwise think to protect or take insufficient care to 
protect in a competitive market economy. Identifiability is thus just 
one aspect of the overall goal of environmental law. But whereas we 
remain cognizant of the market failures that give rise to the general 
need for environmental law, our hubris has caused us to sometimes 
forget that we do not always have all of the stakeholders in front of 
us. We thus do not have sufficient safeguards built in to protect those 
that most need protecting, those that we cannot identify.  
